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Abstract 
  
 This paper analyzes contemporary Russian Foreign Policy toward the Middle 
East.  Six factors are identified as most critical to Russian foreign policy in the region: 
Islamic terrorism, arms transfers, natural resources, influence over former Soviet Spaces, 
general trade, and great power status.  With rare exceptions, these principles are shown to 
guide Russian foreign policy in the Middle East since 2000. 
 The paper continues by considering the effectiveness of Russia in achieving its 
desired policy outcomes in the Middle East.  This includes assessing situations in which 
two or more priorities run counter to each other.  Generally, Russia is shown to be 
effective at achieving its more pragmatic goals, and ineffective at achieving its abstract 
ones. 
 Finally, the paper considers whether or not Russian foreign policy has remained 
consistent through the Arab Spring.  The conclusion is that Russia is presently unable to 
move beyond policies that represent clear mutual benefits with Middle Eastern states.  As 
such, Russia is not a threat to undermine fundamental United States policy objectives in 
the region. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
At the time of this writing, Russia is drawing a considerable amount of 
international ire for impeding efforts to sanction the Assad regime in Syria for its human 
rights violations.  United States Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, who has 
been unable to work around the Russian Security Council veto, said, “it was outrageous 
in any instance for Russia and China to veto a resolution that was really a political 
expression of support […] for the people of Syria and a condemnation of violence. But it 
was even more outrageous that they would do so at a time when Assad was stepping up 
the killing in such a horrific way.”1  Anne-Marie Slaughter, former Director of Policy 
Planning for the State Department, tweeted that, “If Russia does not agree to a UNSC 
resolution they should be held accountable for endorsing continuation of massacres lik 
[sic] that in Homs.”2  Clearly Russia once again has the attention of United States 
policymakers due to its relations with the Middle East. 
 Russian foreign policy in the Middle East has been largely ignored since Russia 
ceased to be part of the Soviet Union.  Many Russian foreign policy observers would 
point out that Russia itself has been forgotten by the West since the USSR collapsed.  For 
many, it was not until the Russia-Georgia conflict of 2008 that Russia reemerged as a 
                                                 
1
 National Public Radio, “Syria Veto ‘Outrageous’ says U.N. Envoy Susan Rice,” wbur (Febrary 4, 2012), 
http://www.wbur.org/npr/146424981/un-ambassador-susan-rice-fumes-at-syria-veto (accessed February 11, 
2012). 
2
 Slaughter, Anne-Marie (SlaughterAM), “If Russia does not agree to a UNSC resolution they should be 
held accountable for endorsing continuation of massacres lik that in Homs,” 4 February 2012, 8:54 a.m. 
Tweet. 
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state that demanded the United States’ attention.  Still, it was not until the Arab Spring of 
2011 that concern over Russia’s approach to the Middle East was again scrutinized, 
mainly because the West hoped to avoid objections to its intervention in Libya.  Libya 
eventually became a North Atlantic Treaty Organization project following Russian and 
Chinese abstention on UN Security Council Resolution 1973, an occurrence that led 
Putin to openly criticize Medvedev for kowtowing to the West.
3
 
 At the time of the Libyan rebellion, Russia’s desire for noninterference was 
partially attributed to a fear among the Russian elite that they could soon find themselves 
facing a popular uprising, and would not want deal with pesky Western interference in 
suppressing their population.  This reasoning resurfaced following Russia’s veto of the 
UN Security Council Resolution on Syria referenced above, including in the New York 
Times.
4
  Other sources, such as the Christian Science Monitor, pointed to Moscow’s 
desire to grow rich from arms sales, despite the human toll paid by the people of Syria.
5
 
These explanations sensationalize Russian policy toward the Middle East, ignoring more 
reasonable explanations for Russia’s refusal of Western solutions to the ongoing conflict.  
 The United States and Russia have had many policy disagreements on the Middle 
East since 2000; February 2011 does not mark the beginning of a new trend.  In 2003, 
Russia lobbied strongly against the US invasion of Iraq, threatening to veto the UN 
                                                 
3
 Fyodor Lukyanov, “Uncertain World: Putin, Medvedev split over Libya,” RiaNovosti, March 22, 2011, 
http://en.rian.ru/columnists/20110322/163148237.html (accessed March 17, 2012). 
4
 Neil MacFarquhar and Michael Schwirtz, “Russia Defends its Diplomacy in Syria Amid Accounts of 
Escalating Violence,” The New York Times, February 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/ 
world/middleeast/syrian-forces-said-to-renew-assault-on-homs.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all# (accessed 
February 8, 2012).  
5
 Fred Wier, “Why Russia is Willing to Sell Arms to Syria,” Christian Science Monitor, January 19, 2012, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0119/Why-Russia-is-willing-to-sell-arms-to-Syria 
(accessed February 9, 2012). 
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Security Council Resolution proposed by the United States calling for unilateral 
disarmament.  In fact, former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was one of the 
last diplomats to petition Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to resolve the confrontation 
peacefully.
6
  Russia’s support for the Iranian nuclear program has also been a major point 
of contention, as Russia has been involved in building and operating the nuclear power 
plant at Bushehr since the mid-1990s.  Finally, Russia has continued to diverge from the 
West on the Peace Process between Israel and Palestine.  Russia tries to maintain positive 
relations with all sides, however its willingness to engage Palestinian groups like Hamas 
is troublesome for those in the United States and elsewhere who consider that party a 
terrorist organization. 
 Beyond the policies that conflict with the West, Russia has important 
relationships with states like Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and others over matters 
that do not concern the West.  Russia and the Middle East represent a fault line in Samuel 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations.  Historical animosity creates a level of distrust with 
Iran and Turkey, among others, that can be difficult to overcome.  Russia is concerned 
that Muslims within its own population will take cues from the political currents of the 
Middle East.  Concerned over Islamic radicalization surrounding the Chechnya issue, 
Russia went to Saudi Arabia to petition its Royal Family to discourage those who view 
Chechnya as part of the Global Jihad.
7
  Despite Turkey and Iran being key competitors 
for influence in the former Soviet Union and having occasionally supported Chechen 
                                                 
6
 Yevgeny Primakov, Russia and the Arabs: Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from the Cold War to the 
Present. Translated by Paul Gould. (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 320. 
7
 Mark N. Katz, “Saudi-Russian Relations since the Abdullah-Putin Summit,” Middle East Policy 16, no. 1 
(2009): 113. 
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separatists, since 2000 Russia has tried to engage them both on security provision in the 
CIS rather than confront them and challenge their interests. 
 During the Soviet period the Middle East was treated as a chessboard, subject to 
great power politics in which Russia hoped to decrease US influence.  While the 
messianic mission of communism waned throughout this period, Russia did have 
strategic footholds, especially in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.  Throughout the 1980s, 1990s, 
and early 2000s, it became clear that Moscow had chosen unreliable friends; drains on 
resources that could not be trusted to obey Moscow’s wishes at critical moments. 
 Today, Russia prefers to do business with more reliable partners, which in the 
case of the Middle East are almost all US allies.  This complicates Russia’s broader 
foreign policy objective of undermining the United States’ “unipolar moment,” in favor 
of a multipolar system; the states Moscow wants to grow closer to are already aligned 
with America.  A reasonable analogy of Russia in the Middle East today is that of a 
builder who is given a new set of blueprints but has already laid a foundation using the 
old set.  Russia wants to inspire a stable, economically productive Middle East, but its 
partners for doing so are Iran, Syria, and Palestinian groups—partners interested in 
challenging the current order of things. 
Research Question, Thesis Statement, and Purpose of Thesis 
There are several research questions guiding this paper: What are the goals of 
Russian foreign policy in the Middle East?  How is Russian foreign policy constructed 
based on these goals?  How have those policies been carried out?  Has Russia been 
successful in achieving its aims in the Middle East through its foreign policy? 
 5 
 
This paper identifies six goals that consistently arise as key issues for Russia in 
the Middle East.  They are fighting terrorism, expanding arms trade, protecting energy 
resource interests, increasing trade, managing influence over former Soviet spaces, and 
enhancing Russia’s status as a Great Power.  I label the first four goals as pragmatic, 
because they are independent of Moscow’s broad foreign policy goals of guarding 
Russia’s Near Abroad and of being seen as an equal by the West.  The latter two are 
abstract goals, meant to supplement Russia’s overarching foreign policy strategy. 
My thesis is that Russian foreign policy in the Middle East has been successful at 
accomplishing its pragmatic goals; however Russia has struggled to achieve its broader 
abstract ends.  Logically, if Russia is deepening relations with Middle Eastern states on 
matters of trade, arms transfers, and security cooperation, it ought to also gain the 
leverage needed to command greater influence on political matters; but this has not 
happened yet. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a holistic view of Russian relations with 
the Middle East.  The cloaked nature of Russian foreign policy has allowed misnomers 
and suspicions about the Russian presence in the region to be treated as fact.  The events 
of the Arab Spring have made common treatment as Russia as a malevolent force 
propping up the region’s strongmen.  In actuality, Russia has only been improving its ties 
to the region in areas that are mutually beneficial for foreign governments. 
Academic interest dropped off dramatically when it became clear that Russia was 
not going to be the security menace for the United States that the Soviet Union had been.   
As a result, only a handful of books and articles have been written on Russian relations 
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with the Middle East and American experts on the topic sparse, although Robert O. 
Freedman and Mark Katz stand out.  Much of the analysis that has been done assesses 
bilateral relationships.  Some scholarship only considers Arab states, leaving out Turkey, 
Iran, and Israel, the three most critical states to Russian interests in the region.  By taking 
a regional view, this thesis should provide fresh insight into Russia’s relations with the 
Middle East. 
Thesis Research Design 
This research will support the thesis statement by establishing that the six 
identified factors are central to Russian foreign policy in the Middle East, by providing 
credibility to the distinction between pragmatic and abstract goals, and by evaluating 
Russia’s effectiveness at achieving its identified goals.  The research will also consider 
how the upheaval of the Arab Spring has altered Russian relations with the region. 
All six factors that this paper tracks appear in some form in Russia’s 2008 Foreign 
Policy Concept.  However, the genesis of their identification is largely a product of my 
own analysis; for example, each factor affects Russian relations with at least five major 
states in the Middle East.  Building the case for their relevance will depend heavily on 
documentary analysis, drawing from official Russian government documents, newspaper 
articles, scholarly journal articles, and authoritative books.  The murky nature of how 
Russian foreign policy is actually set and carried out necessitates reliance on past events 
to identify what drives Moscow’s actions.   
The paper will consider Soviet history in the Middle East to build the argument 
that Moscow learned to not rely on ideological motivations for dealing with the region.  
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Russian foreign policy outside the Middle East will be explained to provide a context of 
policies within the region.  This too will rely on documentary analysis. 
Evaluating the effectiveness of Russian foreign policies will be done 
quantitatively for the four goals identified as pragmatic.  The Global Terrorism Database 
maintained by the University of Maryland will be used for assessing Russia’s ability to 
address terrorism.  The International Arms Transfers database, maintained by the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, will be used to evaluate Russia’s arms 
transfer practices.  Bilateral trade data from the International Monetary Fund will allow 
for assessing Moscow’s ability to increase trade with the Middle East.  Datum from 
OPEC will be used to assess how well Russia has improved its energy resource interests.  
The abstract goals, for which quantitative resources for determining success do not exist, 
will be evaluated using qualitative analysis from secondary sources. 
Significance of the Topic 
An underlying question that this paper considers is whether or not Russian foreign 
policy seeks to undercut United States policy in the Middle East.  The region was once a 
central “theater” of the Cold War, a front line for the United States and Russia to 
challenge each other’s interests.  It is not impossible that it could become so again, 
especially given the region’s vital energy resources.  For United States policymakers, 
Russia and the Middle East are two traditionally puzzling areas.  Even though Russia 
denounced the attacks of September 11
th
 and demonstrated willingness to help the United 
States fight al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, by the end of the Bush 
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Administration relations had soured to the point that the incoming Obama Administration 
saw it necessary to “reset” relations with Russia. 
The United States is the military hegemon in the Middle East, maintaining a large 
presence including Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Naval Support Activity Bahrain, army 
bases in Kuwait, and a training presence throughout the region.  The strength of the US 
position allows the importance of other international actors in the region to be often 
overlooked.  For example, Japan receives approximately 70% of its oil through the Strait 
of Hormuz,
8
 yet discussion of possible closure of the Strait centers on US-Iran relations 
and that contingency’s effects on the United States. 
The rise of China has strengthened the view that the international system is again 
multipolar.  If the United States unipolar moment has passed, then analyses considering 
the roles of other strong states in regions like the Middle East grow in importance.  The 
West is currently trying to guide movements within Arab states toward meaningful 
democratic reform.  In a multipolar system, doing so requires multilateral support, yet in 
the past year Russia and China have been unhappy with West’s democratizing mission.  
Recognizing the interests and motivations driving Moscow’s policy is a more effective 
way of securing cooperation than criticism and name-calling at the United Nations.  
Finally, understanding Russian actions in the Middle East not only provides insight into 
less studied trends in the region, it allows for an improved understanding of Russia itself 
within the evolving international system. 
                                                 
8
 AFP, “Japan Foreign Minister Holds Energy Talks in Saudi,” Al Arabiya, January 8, 2012, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/08/187140.html (accessed January 8, 2012). 
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Organization of Thesis 
This thesis will build a case that the six identified goals of Russian foreign policy 
in the Middle East dictate Russian action in the Middle East, it will explain Russian 
strategies for achieving those goals, and it will provide an assessment of the strategies 
effectiveness.  Structurally, the first chapter gives an introduction to the research.  The 
second chapter will provide context by reviewing contemporary Russian foreign 
policymaking, differentiate Russian treatment of the Middle East from two more 
important regions, the West and the CIS, and explain the pragmatic approach to the 
Middle East relations learned by Moscow during the Soviet period.  Chapter three lays 
out each of the six policy goals, giving evidence for the importance of each.  The fourth 
chapter will evaluate the overall effectiveness of Russia at achieving the six policy goals.  
The fifth chapter will discuss the very recent past by investigating if Russian actions 
throughout the Arab Spring conform to past behavior and laying out how recent 
developments might affect Russian interests in the future.  The sixth chapter will 
conclude the paper and offer recommendations for policymakers and for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: PUTTING RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN CONTEXT 
Russian Foreign Policy Formation 
 The legacy of Russia’s long authoritarian past is relevant, as foreign policy is still 
a highly centralized endeavor, where the Russian elite form the interested public and the 
president’s inner circle is the genesis of policy.  From a legal perspective, Article 80 of 
the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that “the President of the Russian 
Federation shall determine the guidelines of the internal and foreign policies of the 
State.”9  Further, Article 86 states that the Russian President shall “govern the foreign 
policy of the Russian Federation.”10  Even while he is obliged to consult with the 
appropriate committees and commissions, the President alone can appoint and recall 
Russian diplomats and ambassadors.
11
  Robert O. Freedman noted that, “Putin 
consolidated power by replacing everyone and letting his business partners in.”12  An 
example of the president’s ultimate authority was Putin’s decision, against the 
recommendations of his advisors, to cooperate with the United States in Afghanistan.
13
 
From 2007 to 2011, during which time Putin served as Prime Minister, foreign policy 
                                                 
9
 “Chapter 4, Article 80,” The Constitution of the Russian Federation, available at 
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm (accessed February 22, 2012). 
10
 Ibid, Article 86. 
11
 Ibid, Article 84. 
12
 Robert O Freedman, “Can Russia be a Partner for NATO in the Middle East?” in NATO-Russian 
Relations in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Aurel Braun, 123-160, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 
123-124. 
13
 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics (Lanham, Md: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2009), 79. 
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was formally shifted slightly to give greater authority to the Prime Minister, and will 
likely be shifted back as Putin resumes the presidency. 
This system allows for deliberations over foreign policy to be discussed away 
from the public sphere.  As Mike Bowker notes, “Putin has been accused of strengthening 
the power of the state at the expense of personal liberty and freedom of speech.  Putin 
appears particularly intolerant of any form of public criticism.”14  Jeffrey Mankoff writes 
that public discourse is strong, online and in print, but “The public in Russia [only] acts 
as a constraint, limiting the range of policy options the government can adopt—at least in 
a range of high-visibility policy areas.”15  Politics within the Kremlin are the key level of 
decision-making.  Since Vladimir Putin was reelected to the presidency, which now has 
longer term limits (six years instead of four), it is reasonable to assume that he and his 
inner circle will determine Russian foreign policy for the next twelve years.  Thus 
Russian foreign policy should be formed in a consistent pattern with the previous twelve 
years.  However that does not necessarily dictate similar substantive outcomes. 
In placing theoretical framework around governmental decision-making, Graham 
Allison laid out three models: The Rational Actor Model, the Organizational Process 
Model, and the Government Politics Model.
16
  Of the three, the Russian process 
outwardly claims to fit the first model, in which alternative actions for dealing with a 
problem are dually evaluated and the action that delivers the best payoff is identified and 
followed.  This is the method that Yevgeny Primakov endorsed as Foreign Minister in the 
                                                 
14
 Mike Bowker, Russia, America, and the Islamic World, (Burlington, Vt: Ashgate, 2007), 3.  
15
 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 59. 
16
 Graham Allison with Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New 
York: Longman, 1999). 
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mid-1990s, one in which geostrategic interests should be pursued instead of ideologically 
motivated ones.  Primakov’s course was a reaction to Moscow’s early overtures toward 
the West following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which went unappreciated and 
unrewarded.  However the problem then, as several scholars have noted, is assessing 
what the best pragmatic approach is on a given issue.  Bobo Lo wrote in 2003 that 
“Ideology served to ‘legitimize’ self-interest, to cloak the venal in something like 
presentable garb by providing a moral veneer.”17  In reality, the Government Politics 
Model is the best fit for describing current Russian foreign policy decision-making. 
In 2009, in a chapter titled “Bulldogs Fighting under the Rug,” Jeffrey Mankoff 
describes Russian foreign policymaking as a hotly contested process undertaken by actors 
away from the public arena.  The proverbial battle lines are drawn on the basis of 
ideology, specifically on how the actors view Russia’s place in the world.  He compares 
Russia’s Security Council to the United States’ National Security Council as a policy 
coordinating body, and explains that centralizing power to the council “allowed Putin to 
impose a fairly coherent vision of the national interest in a way that was not consistently 
possible during the Yeltsin-Primakov years, when regional and sectorial interests often 
took predominance.”18  Further, he says that under Putin, “large energy companies and 
security services have replaced the influence of the legislature and regional governors in 
foreign policy formation.”19  Even Lo, writing during Putin’s first presidential term, 
noted that economics interests now have as great of an impact on foreign policy making 
                                                 
17
 Bobo Lo, Russian foreign policy in the post-soviet era: Reality, illusion and mythmaking (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2002), 64. 
18
 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 55. 
19
 Ibid, 56. 
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as the power ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.
20
  To complete his consolidation 
of power, Putin placed allies from Russian Intelligence into high military positions to rein 
in and control the military.
21
 
The remaining competition within the Kremlin over foreign policy outcomes is 
based on differing views of Russia’s place in the world.  The central questions that these 
policymakers consider are is Russia a great power and is Russia a Western or a Eurasian 
state?  How those questions are answered shape general Russian foreign policy outlook.  
Lo explains that in the early nineties, these differing viewpoints were fiercely contested, 
and it became President Boris Yeltsin’s preference to build consensus or, short of that, 
allow deadlock.
22
  Under Putin the strand of thinking that sees Russia as a great power 
with a Western-centric outlook, although does not identify Russia as Western, has 
emerged as dominant.  Other viewpoints still have their adherents, and as was mentioned 
earlier, these ideological battles are sometimes undercut by financially motivated actors.   
In 2000 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the “National Security 
Concept of the Russian Federation,” and then in 2008 published the “The Foreign Policy 
Concept of the Russian Federation.”  Lo describes the former document as window 
dressing, meant to create the illusion of a Realist Model of decision-making that offered 
commentary on current, hot political issues.
23
  Mankoff describes the latter document as 
noteworthy for highlighting the slight differences between Putin’s foreign policy and 
                                                 
20
 Lo, Russian foreign policy in the post-soviet era, 34. 
21
 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 58. 
22
 Lo, Russian foreign policy in the post-soviet era, 4-5. 
23
 Ibid, 66-70. 
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President Dmitry Medvedev’s.24  The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept places a strong 
emphasis on multilateral cooperation on international challenges, advocating for “the 
emergence of a new world order” that centralizes the role of the United Nations and 
international law.
25
  It also calls for states to cooperate in security provision, and for a 
reduction of the use of force between states.  Most importantly, it elevates relations with 
CIS member states over those with the West, as part of what is called “multi-vector 
foreign policy.”26 
Given the difficulty of seeing behind the screen of Russian foreign policy 
formation, the next sections will investigate how Putin and his associates have been 
conducting foreign policy since 2000.  Such an approach begins by considering the two 
regions most central on the Russian agenda. 
Russian Relations with NATO and the CIS 
The Middle East is not central to current Russian foreign policy concerns, which 
instead center on Russia’s relationship with NATO and the CIS.  At times, the Middle 
East becomes an instrument of those relationships, but in other instances Russian 
relations with the region stand out because of the absence of the charged approach that 
accompany relations with NATO and the CIS.  This section will provide details of 
Russian relations with the West and the former Soviet states before concluding with a 
discussion that differentiates the Middle East in the Russian outlook. 
                                                 
24
 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 12-13. 
25
 Russian Foreign Ministry, “2008 Foreign Policy Concept,” available at 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml (accessed February 22, 2012). 
26
 Ibid. 
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During the Cold War, NATO was established primarily to secure member states 
against the communist threat, embodied by the Soviet Union-led Warsaw Pact.  When the 
Soviet Union collapsed, Russia watched helplessly as former allies streamed into the 
American-backed security alliance.
27
  Worse still was Russian humiliation over the 
emptiness of Western overtures during then-Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’s attempts 
to integrate Russia into the Western community of states.
28
  Moscow was shocked by 
NATO’s continued existence in the absence of the Soviet threat, and discussed internally 
seeking to join NATO.  Kozyrev’s successor, and later Prime Minister, Yevgeny 
Primakov realigned Russian foreign policy into a pragmatic, realist approach that was 
more skeptical of the West. 
 Throughout the 1990s, Russian policymakers were torn trying to define Russia’s 
direction, primarily between an aspiration to follow and achieve the success of Western 
countries and a still lingering distrust of the West.
29
  Scholarly descriptions of Russian 
sentiment toward the United States at the time evoke imagery of a spurned romantic.
30
  
Having lost its economic power and military strength, Russia clung to its remaining 
vestiges of greatness—its veto power within the UN Security Council and its large 
nuclear arsenal.  The latter has had its foreign policy usefulness discounted as an 
unsavory tool for statecraft, while the former has motivated an odd new Russian 
                                                 
27
 Oksana Antonenko and Bastian Guegerich, "Rebooting NATO-Russia Relations," Survival 51, no. 2 
(2009): 13-4. 
28
 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 31. 
29
 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 71-4. 
30
 Lo, Russian foreign policy in the post-soviet era, 23-4.  
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emphasis on the sanctity of international law and procedure, so long as Russia’s near 
abroad is not involved.
31
   
 The most egregious violation of Russian input on security matters was NATO’s 
1999 actions in Kosovo, a newly independent state that Russia still does not recognize.
32
  
For Russia, this was a wakeup call that the West truly did not care for its input on 
security matters, but instead merely paid Russia lip service.  Under Vladimir Putin’s 
presidency, which began in 2000, Russia began to see new economic growth and 
completed its turn away from deference to the West.  Although much of the growth was 
due to energy resource exports, which mostly filled the coffers of a few oligarchs, the 
average annual income in Russia rose from 2,000 USD to 9,000 USD from 1998 to 
2009.
33
  When Putin sided with the United States’ war in Afghanistan, he expected 
Russia to be a key ally and dispenser of advice, given the Soviet experience there.
34
  
Instead, Russia was asked to do little more than allow NATO to transit supplies. 
 Nor did Russian support create new American respect for Russian foreign policy 
interests.  The United States endorsed the Color Revolutions, which were viewed in 
Moscow as a major security concern and detrimental to Russian interests.
35
  The United 
States invaded Iraq in 2003 despite Russia’s UN Security Council veto, robbing Russia of 
a rare, albeit caustic, Middle Eastern ally.  NATO continued to enlarge, adding states like 
Estonia and Latvia among others in 2004, thereby pushing NATO to the border of the 
                                                 
31
 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 54-5. 
32
 In July 2008, the main focus of a summit of the NATO-Russia Council was still Kosovo. See NATO 
Document, "NATO Summit: Joint Statement on NATO-Russia Relations," Hampton Roads International 
Security Quarterly 3435 (2008). 
33
 "Smoke and mirrors." Economist 386, no. 8569, March 2008, 27. 
34
 "In search of détente, once again." Economist 392, no. 8638, July 4, 2009, 22. 
35
 The color revolutions were Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in 2004, Georgia’s Rose Revolution in 2003, 
and Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution in 2005. 
 17 
 
Russian mainland.  A 2006 NATO initiative, pushed by the United States but resisted by 
Germany and others, declared that NATO membership would eventually be extended to 
Ukraine and Georgia.
36
  Throughout this time period, the United States encouraged the 
construction of alternative natural gas lines from the Caspian Sea through Georgia and 
Turkey to Europe, which would challenge the Russian monopoly on the supply of natural 
gas. 
 This set the stage for the August 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, in 
which Russia finally sought to reassert itself through the application of hard power.  
Georgia, under the outspoken leadership of Mikhail Saakashvili, was seen by Moscow as 
the most direct incursion of US influence in Russia’s perceived zone of privileged 
interest.
37
  Framing the Georgian breakaway provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
analogous to Kosovo, Russian peacekeeping troops invaded Georgia, an attack that was 
more or less successful.  The conflict sparked concern throughout Europe and in the 
United States that an imperialist, bellicose Russia had returned, and forced NATO 
members consider whether or not Georgia was a state worthy of extending Article Five 
protection to.
38
  The attack also had the effect of challenging the reliability of pipelines in 
Georgia meant to bypass Russian control, pulling customers back into Gazprom’s orbit. 
 Several months later Barack Obama was elected president and dispatched 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to “reset” relations with the new Russian President 
Dmitry Medvedev.  Obama’s policy aims focused on combating terrorism, piracy, illegal 
                                                 
36
 "Redrawing the MAP in Europe." Economist 387, no. 8575, April 12, 2008, 57-58. 
37
 "After Georgia." Economist 388, no. 8594, August 23, 2008, 42. 
38
 Ibid, 41. 
 18 
 
drugs, and nuclear proliferation, and jointly reducing nuclear arsenals.
39
  Since the 2009 
reset, Russia has not crossed any additional international borders.  It recently completed a 
purchase of four French Mistral warships,
40
 and reached a deal with Germany to build a 
new natural gas pipeline directly to Germany, bypassing troublesome Eastern European 
states that irk Russia into sporadically stopping the flow of gas as punishment.
41
  There is 
some hope that Russian behavior has, inexplicably, altered: 
Russia's foreign policy has changed--and the change goes beyond rhetoric. After 40 years 
of tedious talks, Russia has signed a maritime border agreement with Norway. It is using 
soft power in Ukraine. Perhaps most significant is the improvement in relations with 
Poland, a centuries-old irritant. After years of exploiting differences between old and new 
members of the European Union, Vladimir Putin, Russia's prime minister, has realized 
that EU solidarity is more than mere rhetoric.
42
 
 
If the change is legitimate, then it is set to continue under Vladimir Putin, who will 
reassume the presidency in 2012.
43
 
In an era that emphasizes collective security, Russia lacks foreign allies.  As 
Russia surveys its place in the world, it is “strategically boxed in” by American 
partners.
44
  It is a member of the CIS, but those states often have contentious relations 
with Russia due to Moscow’s bullying leadership.  Impulses of imperialism still exist, as 
Russia treats these states with neglect and condescension but also guards them against the 
influence of other powers.
45
  Several pariah states, such as Iran and Venezuela, are allies, 
but they do little to improve Russian standing.  Even states beholden to Russian gas 
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subsidies are problematic partners for Russia, especially Belarus.
46
  China shares Russian 
concerns on matters of state sovereignty at the United Nations, but simply keeping a 
neutral relationship represents progress from their tumultuous past.  Despite the oft-
invoked Russian emblem of a double-headed eagle that looks both East and West, Russia 
has never been seriously focused on Asia; even today it supplies less than 3% of oil 
exports to East Asia.
47
   
 Economic shortcomings have limited Russia’s ability to finance its military.  
The decline in Moscow's conventional army since the Cold War has been dramatic: from 
an almost four million-strong Soviet army in the 1980s, with 10,000 strategic and 30,000 
tactical nuclear missiles and the annual production of 3,000 tanks, 600 aircraft, and 20 
warships, the current Russian army has shrunk to around one million soldiers with a 
severely curbed nuclear arsenal and a budgetary crisis seriously undermining its navy and 
its military industry.
48
   
 
Russia cannot keep up with NATO, even as many of its members spend next to nothing 
on defense, which creates for Moscow a reliance on the nuclear arsenal.  But NATO is 
unlikely to attack Russia, despite Russian paranoia.  The more pressing concern for the 
Russian military should be its ability to address instability along its southern borders, 
which it is currently not well-equipped to easily combat.  In 2012, Putin announced a ten 
year program to increase spending and reequip the military.
49
 
 Russia is capable of pursuing foreign policy aims in neighboring states that lack 
the protection of the NATO alliance.  Russia’s internal problems may make it more likely 
to assert itself outwardly, a not-uncommon occurrence for autocratic states.  Arthur 
Rachwald speculates that  
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it is possible that contemporary Russian assertiveness is in essence defensive. Despite the 
financial strength derived from energy exports, Russia is an economic dwarf with nuclear 
weapons, and its political consensus is fabricated from above under the rubric of 
managed democracy. The contemporary assertiveness of Moscow may reflect a deep 
sense of political insecurity and international vulnerability that fuels the effort to extend 
its influence and construct favorable networks of coalitions before its relative influence 
and power are curtailed even further.
50
 
 
Russia still considers itself an important world power, and now views itself as a key node 
in the multipolar system.  Thus, a sense of entitlement to be dominant over its region is 
again apparent.  Jeffrey Mankoff explains, 
Russian elites never stopped believing that the Near Abroad was for Moscow a zone of 
special interest and responsibility, a point Medvedev merely made explicit in the 
aftermath of the 2008 war.  Russia’s temporary cession on initiative to outside power in 
the region was always more a result of Russian weakness than any sort of more 
fundamental transformation in the nature of the Russian state or the way its leadership 
identified its interests.
51
 
 
Russian history is filled with invasions that had to be fended off at great cost, from 
Napoleon’s army to Hitler’s, where victory laid in Russia’s vastness.  So against 
perceived encirclement by the United States, which Russians identify as the second 
biggest threat to their country after Georgia, the key strategy is again to create a buffer 
zone.
52
  “Russia may not be trying to recreate an empire—it has neither the energy, 
human resources or ideology for that—but it is trying to prevent the West from entering 
its sphere of influence[…] What Russia wants is a buffer zone, with no American 
military bases of NATO presence.”53  While diplomatic methods are given a chance, in 
the Georgia case military means won out—“The first targets in Georgia last August were 
military installations built to NATO standards.”54 
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 Russia yearns to be acknowledged as a fellow great power by the dominant 
Western states.  Rachwald explains, “The real anachronism in contemporary politics is 
Moscow's imperial nostalgia, with its promotion of authoritarianism and the continuation 
of cold war perceptions and objectives.”55  Every sidestepped Security Council veto is a 
blow to this ambition.  Russia’s position on the G8 is a point of pride, despite being 
originally awarded the spot as a diplomatic concession, yet still Medvedev is quoted as 
saying, “The G8 will be practically unable to function without Russia.  That’s why we 
don’t fear being expelled.”56  While Russia lacks the capacity to project power far beyond 
its border, it can pretend, and it can insist on having a say on key security topics, such as 
the Israel-Palestine peace process, nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea, and the 
upheaval in states like Libya and Syria.  Between its leverage over Europe derived from 
natural gas and America struggling with efforts in Afghanistan and Iran, “Russia’s elite is 
convinced that the West is weak and will swallow Russia’s decision(s).”57 
Still, Russia continues to measure itself against the United States, despite having 
elected to pursue divergent economic and political systems.   
In Russia's view, everything America does in the world is aimed against Russia and 
everything aimed against Russia is directed by America. Russia measures itself by its 
ability to stand up to America. But America is also a model of power that Russia wants to 
copy. Imitation and resentment go together.  Russia's sense of resurgence is mixed with a 
deeply rooted inferiority complex.
58
   
 
The Russian elite are tied more closely to the West compared to average Russians, so 
their perspective reinforces the foreign policy emphasis.  “The loudest anti-Americans in 
Russia are not the unreformed communists but the well-dressed, English-speaking 
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speech-writers form the perestroika era.”59  The relationship is certainly odd, but is one in 
which the United States has leverage to influence Russian policy decisions.  Further, 
Russia is coming to realize that a policies motivated primarily by anti-Americanism are at 
risk of backfiring.
60
 
Russia’s multifaceted identity allows it to shift its allegiances around 
pragmatically.  In this way, Russia can act as a balancing power, typically against the 
United States, by siding conveniently with China or France and Germany, Iran or 
Venezuela.  Conversely, should a rising China appear dominant, Russia will not hesitate 
to join the United States to ensure balance in East Asia.
61
  At a smaller level, Russia 
seeks to distinguish the politicians of bordering states into categories of pro-Russian or 
not pro-Russian.  For actors in states like Uzbekistan or Ukraine, having Russian backing 
can reinforce domestic power, and conversely not having it can invite Russian 
interference and duplicity.  
Statements from Putin and Medvedev indicate that Russia now views economic 
power as a key facet of a state’s hard power.  Because of the union between the gas 
industry and the political leadership, the two are partners in improving each other’s 
fortune.  Russia views manipulation of the supply of gas as a legitimate tool of foreign 
policy.  It has been suggested that giving Russia WTO membership will force it to follow 
new rules so that it must compete fairly on economic matters.
62
  That may not be enough.  
If Russia believes that a weak neighbor is cheating on an economic matter, say to win a 
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large foreign investment, that may soon become grounds for Russia to use hard power 
instruments to settle the score. 
Finally, Russia’s historical experience legitimizes concerns that Moscow will be 
not be hesitant in entering conflicts.  Having lost 27 million people in World War II, if a 
nuclear strategy can better limit casualties, it will be seen as legitimate, especially since 
Russia lacks the capacity to conduct a major conventional war against NATO forces.  
Russia under Putin has renounced its pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons in 
a conflict.
63
  Its war games in 2009 included a simulated nuclear attack on Warsaw as 
part of the strategy.
64
  During the Cold War NATO was cornered in Europe, overmatched 
in conventional forces, and chose a nuclear first use policy; now Russia has been driven 
back, is at a conventional force disadvantage, but draws Western scorn for electing a first 
use policy.
65
  It is unclear where the line is that makes nuclear war acceptable for Russia, 
but it is important to be mindful that such a line does exist, likely based on Russia’s 
territorial integrity, and can be crossed. 
 Russia’s security concerns are largely motivated by perceived threats to internal 
stability that could derail its prospering economy.  Sean Kay lays out what Russia views 
as threats to that stability:  
Russian official doctrine defines major threats as including: territorial claims to the 
Russian Federation from other post-Soviet states; local wars and armed conflicts near 
Russia’s borders; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery; the rights of Russians living in other former Soviet republics; and the 
enlargement of external military blocks such as NATO.
66
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Russia’s proclivity is to pursue its security interests through unilateral action.  For dealing 
with local wars on its borders, Russia will attempt to find solutions through diplomatic 
mechanisms, but these can be abandoned in short order for military solutions, or some 
other hard power mechanism. 
 For example, Russia wants to stop NATO’s enlargement.  When Georgia was 
highlighted as a candidate for membership in 2006, Russia objected but was unable to 
have its reservations gain traction.  Writing in 2007, Ponsard concluded that, “The 
Kremlin [has] finally accepted – although reluctantly – that it had neither the power nor 
influence to oppose NATO membership for aspirant countries.”67  This turned out to be 
untrue.  After a series of small escalations, Russia invaded Georgia, effectively ending its 
chance at membership in NATO. 
 Other neighboring states rightly took notice.  Ukraine has, like Georgia, a leader 
for whom Vladimir Putin has publicly expressed disdain.  Russia bases its Baltic Sea fleet 
at a Ukrainian port in Crimea whose lease is set to expire in several years.  Moscow will 
still first seek a diplomatic settlement for keeping the base, but will not hesitate to turn to 
alternative ways and means.  Russia has tried to convince Kyrgyzstan to remove an 
American Air Force base, and it only now appears that Bishkek will cooperate.
68
   
 Many of these actions are characteristic of a receding former empire trying to 
prevent decay and salvage possessions.  There are areas where Russia is actively 
expanding its power; maintaining the gas monopoly is both lucrative and provides a non-
military source of leverage over Europe in foreign policy disputes.  But as for the 
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messianic goal of challenging the international system and America’s privileged place 
within it, frustration abounds.  Russia does not have the strength to enforce the new 
multipolar order it hopes for.  Russia lacks friends.  There is debate between scholars as 
to whether relations with the West or with the CIS are a higher priority for Russia.
69
  The 
answer seems to indicate what scholars view as the Russian strategy to again become a 
great power, liberal cooperation or realist entrenchment respectively.  Moscow’s actions 
suggest maintaining exclusive domain in the CIS and having the West’s respect are both 
priorities.  In some ways, Russian policies in the Middle East contribute to those goals. 
Differentiating the Middle East 
The Middle East does not pose threats to Russian security in the way that the 
West or the CIS do.  The biggest Middle East security concern is states’ encouragement 
of Islamic radicals in Russia’s south.  Russia is also attentive to causes of instability in 
the region, such as the possibility of Iran gaining nuclear weapons.  Nor does Russia have 
the same types of historical legacies in the Middle East that it does with the West and the 
CIS.  While Turkey and Iran have had problematic relations with Russia since Russia’s 
imperialist age, the Arab states’ relations with Moscow began in earnest following World 
War II.
70
 
Immediately following World War II, the Soviet Union presented itself as an anti-
imperialist ally to the region, seeking to expunge British and French influence.  It was, 
with the United States, one of the first countries to recognize Israel.  The USSR also 
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worked within the UN Security Council Resolution to resolve the Suez Canal Crisis, 
although the eventual draft resolution was ultimately vetoed by Britain and France.
71
  
Under Khrushchev’s leadership, the Soviet Union still believed that it could encourage 
local communist parties to overthrow their governments and create socialist states.  
Primakov notes that this mission was especially critical to the ComIntern.
72
  For this 
reason the Moscow gained a unique reputation for disturbing world order and stability 
while pursuing its interests, even though states like the Britain, France, and the United 
States engage in similar ways.
73
  While the US and the USSR found common ground on 
issues in the Middle East in the 1950s, once British and French influence had waned in 
the mid-1960s, the two powers both scrambled to gain influence in the region vis-à-vis 
the other.  Competition for allies in the region would last throughout the Cold War. 
In the beginning, Primakov writes, the Soviet Union had only three allies—Egypt, 
Syria, and Iraq—a difficult circumstance because all three governments were anti-
communist.
74
  These relationships consisted of arms transfers and rhetorical support, but 
little else.  Having to decide between supporting communism or countering the United 
States, Moscow elected to ally with governments it disagreed with ideologically.  The 
USSR would, throughout this period, threaten to withdraw support in response to 
government excesses in imprisoning communists, but rarely acted upon these warnings. 
This pragmatic decision, to ignore the mission of spreading communism 
internationally, was never reversed, becoming further consolidated under Brezhnev.  
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Primakov relates an incident in Sudan, where the communist party was prepared to 
orchestrate a coup against the government against the behest of the USSR.  Moscow was 
alarmed, objecting that the Sudanese government was already friendly to Moscow; 
exchanging it for a communist government was not worth the risk of losing a known 
ally.
75
  Mark Katz describes Soviet relations with Kuwait in that period as strong because 
the two governments created a relationship based on an understanding that the Soviets 
would not encourage communist factions in Kuwait.
76
  There was a real fear among 
Middle Eastern governments that Moscow could choose to overthrow them; this fear was 
encouraged by the United States so that they could draw states the American orbit, as was 
the case with Lebanon.
77
 
This was true for both Turkey and Iran.  The Shah justified his high spending on 
American arms by constantly citing the red threat.  Part of the reason he could not grasp 
the challenge that the politicized Ayatollahs represented was his vision being clouded by 
the communist challenge.  This is why Iran sent troops to Oman in the 1970s; to ensure 
that communism would not spread from Yemen to Oman, putting a Russian ally on the 
Strait of Hormuz choke point.  When revolution finally came to Iran in 1979, the Tudeh 
party was involved, but had minimal impact on the revolution’s success.  Likewise in 
Turkey, Ataturk and his followers, who battled the Russians and Soviets in the early part 
of the twentieth century, were wary of communism.  Having decided to pursue Western 
style governance, and aware of Soviet interest in gaining control of the Bosporus Strait 
                                                 
75
 Primakov, Russia and the Arabs, 80. 
76
 Mark Katz, Russia & Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula, (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1986), 167. 
77
 Primakov, Russia and the Arabs, 185. 
 28 
 
and the Dardanelles, the Turkish government began imprisoning Turkish communists.  In 
1947 Stalin massed troops on the border, which was a bluff, and “the consequence of this 
venture was to push the previously neutral Turkey into the arms of the anti-Soviet 
camp.”78  The United States successfully lobbied for Turkey’s entry into NATO in 1952.  
Throughout the Cold War Turkey would try to expunge domestic leftist groups. 
Primakov writes that the Soviet Union was never responsible for bringing down 
any Arab monarchies; merely that it supported ripe moments.  “The Soviet Union 
understood that it was impossible to bring about sociopolitical change in another country 
via an imported revolution; it had to happen from within, when the time was ripe.”79  The 
major conflict in the 1960s and 1970s was that between Israel and its neighbors.  
Moscow’s relationship with Israel had soured because of concern for Israeli influence 
over Soviet Jews, as well as a possible brain drain.
80
  Once the Cold War competition had 
begun, Moscow was sponsoring Israel’s two main enemies.  During the 1967 and 1973 
wars, as with the 1956 crisis, the USSR’s main concern was preventing the conflagration 
from spreading into a general war between itself and the United States.  This would have 
happened if either side had been routed.  For Russia, the more significant development of 
this period was Egypt’s decision to join the American camp, eventually reaching a peace 
agreement with Israel in 1979.  Talal Nizameddin explains, “For Cairo, there was 
disappointment with Moscow at the limit of its economic capabilities in providing 
technological and financial assistance. Moreover, Moscow appeared to hold back in 
providing the most advanced attack weapons which would create military parity between 
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Egypt and Israel.”81  While Egypt became a regional pariah for peace agreement with 
Israel, the Soviets lost a key ally essentially without a fight.  At the time Soviet standing 
was at a high point, given its increasingly amenable relations with Iran, Turkey, Egypt, 
Iraq, and Syria while the United States was bogged down in Vietnam.
82
  Egypt’s marked 
a major turning point for Moscow in the Middle East.   
While the Arab-Israeli conflict was a key factor in the period, control over Gulf 
oil was another.  Part of the US strategy was preventing USSR adventurism from 
disrupting the flow of oil.
83
  During this period Moscow was receiving Iraqi oil in 
exchange for weapons and then reselling it, but lacked ties to the rest of the oil-producing 
Gulf.
84
  Moscow had an opportunity to reach a breakthrough with the Saudis in the late 
1970s as they bristled at US treatment, but the USSR invasion of Afghanistan cemented 
poor relations.  By the 1980s, Moscow had few remaining allies region wide, all of whom 
were withdrawn enough from Soviet influence to ignore or disobey Moscow’s wishes.  
The USSR instructed Saddam Hussein not to go to war with Iran in 1980 after tolerating 
his 1978 anti-communist campaign, but Hussein attacked anyway.  This ruined that 
alliance, so much so that Moscow offered to support Iran in the war, although Iran under 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was disinterested in Soviet support. 
For Moscow, there are three key lessons learned from the Cold War period in 
dealing with the Middle East.  The first is that ideological motivations will fail because of 
cultural incongruities, so relations must be conducted pragmatically.  The second is that 
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Middle Eastern leaders are calculating, unreliable, and untrustworthy.  The third is that 
the United States is incredibly dubious, capable of undercutting an alliance even when it 
seems most impossible to do so.  By the end of the Cold War, a thoroughly 
outmaneuvered Moscow reached the conclusion that if control cannot be established in 
the Middle East, then stability is the next best thing.
85
 
That supposition was critical in Moscow’s decision under Gorbachev to not 
pursue creating strategic parody between Syria and Israel; it was seen as too 
destabilizing.
86
  By 1991 any traces of adventurism had vanished, as “Soviet interests in 
Israel and Iraq […] were pursued carefully so as not to cause a rupture in relations with 
the United States.”87  Instead, relations were pursued with an ever-present caution against 
stirring instability. 
Under Boris Yeltsin, foreign relations with the Middle East lapsed entirely.  
Throughout the 1990’s, not one state visit was paid by Yeltsin to a Muslim majority 
country.
88
  Israel was even concerned that a disinterested, economically struggling Russia 
might sell off some of its nuclear weapons to its Arab neighbors.
89
  As Robert Gates 
lauded in his 1996 book, President George Bush was able to convince the Russians to 
endorse his coalition to throw the Iraqi army out of Kuwait.
90
  Conversely, Bowker writes 
that the Soviets did have a deal in place to allow Saddam Hussein to save face, however 
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this option was rejected by the Bush Administration.
91
  It’s worth noting that relations 
between Moscow and Tehran warmed in 1989 and continually improved throughout the 
1990s.  In 1996, developments in the now US-led Middle East Peace Process excluded 
Moscow entirely, and while Russia was irked by their non-inclusion, there was little to be 
done beyond offering pro-Arab rhetoric.
92
  Moscow was a longtime ally of Yasser Arafat, 
but they were unable to advance the Palestinian cause in the way that the United States 
doggedly guarded Israeli interests.   
Two events significant for future Russian relations in the Middle East took place 
outside of the Middle East.  First, the movement for Chechen independence from Russia 
began at this time.  Bowker argues that Islam was not a key factor in the first war but 
would be in the second, as the killing of Muslims by a non-Muslim government would 
attract the attention and fervor of radical Islamic groups.
93
  Second, conflicts in Bosnia 
and Kosovo set a precedent for Russia that the West was willing to interfere in the affairs 
of smaller states, even when Russia had legitimate strategic objections. 
The Middle East is far enough geographically from Russia to lie beyond its zone 
of privileged interest, so Russian actions there are more subject to the rules of 
international law that Russia claims to follow and advocate.  Primakov points out that the 
Soviet Union bordered the region, but Russia does not.
94
  The absence of any obvious 
regional power reinforces the view that the Middle East is a legitimate area for the United 
Nations to officiate developments, without any one country achieving dominance.  That 
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the United States is the country closest to obtaining hegemony in the Middle East is 
doubly irksome for Moscow.  Russia was increasingly relegated, locked out of the 
Middle East Peace Process and having only the region’s pariah states as allies.  Russian 
strategy by this time had no ideological bend, and had shifted to an entirely pragmatic 
mode.  
 33 
 
CHAPTER THREE: CURRENT RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE  
MIDDLE EAST 
 There are currently six key priorities that guide Russian decision making in the 
Middle East.  They are Islamic terrorism, arms transfers, natural resources, influence 
within the Commonwealth of Independent States, general trade, and great power status.  
Other concerns, like the status of Russian émigrés in Israel, are important but not central 
to policymaking.  Also, specific policy issues like the creation of a Palestinian state will 
be split among the priorities motivating Russia’s stance on a particular issue.  In this 
chapter, each of these priorities will be considered in turn.   
 It is Russia’s preference to conduct foreign policy through state relations rather 
than work within international organizations.  So while the 2008 Foreign policy concept 
mentions a desire to work with the Organization of Islamic Conference and the League of 
Arab States, more important is when it says “Russia intends to further develop its 
relations with Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, and 
other leading regional States in bilateral and multilateral formats.”95  The states that 
concern Russia on the largest number of the six priorities that I have named are Turkey, 
Iran, and Israel. 
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Terrorism 
The Second Chechen War, which began in late 1999, featured foreign 
mujahedeen with ties to Al Qaeda, creating a new focus for Russian foreign policy in the 
Middle East.  Islamic Radicalization was not a key factor in the First Chechen War, but 
was in the second, and the long insurgency that followed the conclusion of major combat 
operations had a distinct terrorism component.
96
  Limiting foreign support to the 
Chechens, particularly from Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran, became a 
central concern.  This includes both rhetorical support and material support.  This section 
will detail Russian efforts to curtail Middle Eastern support for Chechen militants, 
discuss Russia’s interaction with the United States’ Global War on Terror, and inspect 
Russian policies on terrorism within the Middle East. 
Demographic trends in Russia are startling, as the population is currently 
decreasing by 800,000 people annually.  The Muslim population is already at 25 million 
and exhibits a higher fertility rate than ethnic Russians, who will make up an ever 
decreasing share of the population.  Moscow’s goal is to defend Russia’s territorial 
integrity, and doing so means not demonizing the Chechens themselves as an other, but 
instead targeting vitriol toward subversive foreign influences.  For Putin, the roots of 
rising terrorism “lay in the region’s continuing mass unemployment, in the lack of an 
effective social policy, and in the low educational levels of the younger generation.”97  
These factors make Russian Muslims susceptible to radicalization.   
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Based on data from the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland, 
terrorism in Russia is generally on the rise, although major attacks, which are more 
consistently reported, have not followed any distinct pattern.  The following chart depicts 
the number of terrorist attacks in Russia that caused more than ten casualties by year: 
 
Figure 1: Terrorist attacks in Russia with ten or more casualties annually since 1999 
The two most important events for Russia’s fight against terrorism were the September 
11
th
 attacks in 2001 and the Beslan School attack in September 2004.  The effects of the 
former will be discussed in more detail later.  The latter, which led to 332 deaths 
including many children, is significant in that it prompted high level tours of the Middle 
East by President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to impress upon 
other leaders the importance of cutting support for Chechen separatists.
 98
  The problem 
often was not official government support for Chechnya, but states tacitly allowing 
support networks to exist within their states.  For example, some estimates suggest that as 
much as $100 million reached Chechens annually from Saudi Arabia.        
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Turkey has a large Caucasian community that supports Chechnya’s separatists.99  
In 2003, Russia expelled ten Turkish nationals for supposedly inciting instability.
100
  
President Putin’s 2004 visit to Ankara drew protests from pro-Chechnya Turkish 
citizens.
101
  Bulent Aras writes  
According to the official Turkish policy line, the Chechen question is a Russian internal 
problem.  Turkish officials frequently declare that Russian security measures should not 
violate human rights in Chechnya.  However, a large Chechen diaspora in Turkey follows 
a different line and tries its best to assist Chechen guerillas, creating significant tensions 
between the Turkish and Russian governments.
102
 
 
Shireen Hunter writes that while Turkey (and Iran to some degree) plays down Islam in 
their relations with former Soviet States, “it has also used the Islamic factor and its 
extensive Islamic infrastructure to penetrate Muslim parts of Russia and the CIS.”103  
Further, “Private Turkish citizens have built mosques in the Russian Federation, from 
Makhachkala to Ufa.  The Turkish government, while suppressing Islamic groups in 
Turkey itself, has supported these activities.”104  Despite disagreements over support for 
Chechnya, Since Putin’s 2004 Russia and Turkey have maintained a limited strategic 
partnership that has mollified disputes. However for Russia, working closely with Turkey 
on terrorism is dubious for a less obvious reason: it invites American involvement.
105
 
In 2003, Russians began working with Saudi Arabia to earn that state’s 
denunciation of the War in Chechnya as a legitimate Islamic cause.
106
  Beyond lending 
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their influence, the Saudis had the ability to cut off much of the zakat funds that went into 
financing the jihadist insurgency there.  Hunter writes “assistance from official and 
private Saudi sources has clearly been channeled to the Chechens,” although much of the 
official help came as humanitarian aid and was funneled through Moscow.
107
  
Jordan is another state that has become involved with Russia on this issue; a result 
of its large Chechen community.  In 2006, Russian security forces killed Abu Hafs al-
Urdani, the Jordanian-born commander of foreign fighters in Chechnya.
108
  Hunter 
singles out another Gulf State: “relations with the UAE suffered most because of UAE-
based financial institutions’ support and official sympathy for the Chechen cause.”109  
Earlier, in 2003, Russia assassinated a Chechen leader in Qatar after Qatar refused to 
arrest and extradite him.  Following the assassins’ trial in Doha, they were sent back to 
Russia to serve their sentences.  Another result of Russia’s push was an Israeli offer for 
“sharing of information on safeguarding critical installations, the training of 
counterterrorism specialists, and the exchange of intelligence data.”110 
Back in 1997, Russia succeeded in having Iran support its case at the OIC on the 
Chechnya issue, which was a forum of criticism.  Iran’s official stance has long been that 
Chechnya was an internal Russian matter, although many within Iran have criticized their 
state’s stance.  However, for pragmatic reasons, both governments elect to ignore those 
voices.  Moreover, because Iran is Shi’ite and the majority of Muslim Russians are Sunni, 
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material support never accompanied rhetorical support, either from elements within Iran, 
including the Revolutionary Guard Corps. 
Despite their successes in combatting support for terrorism emanating from the 
Middle East, Moscow remains wary.  In 2009 Mark Katz spoke to Russia’s fears that as 
the United States draws down its presence in Iraq and Afghanistan focus will again return 
to Russia: 
You remember al-Qaeda in Iraq? These were busy boys, fighting against the Americans, 
fighting against the Shiites, fighting against their fellow Sunnis. But what did al Qaeda in 
Iraq do in June 2006? They kidnapped five employees of the Russian embassy in 
Baghdad, killed one out of hand and then announced that they would release the 
remaining four only if Russia withdrew all its troops from Chechnya within 48 hours. 
This did not happen. And al-Qaeda in Iraq, being true to their word, killed the remaining 
four employees. These people were fighting Americans, Sunnis, Shias in Iraq, yet al-
Qaeda in Iraq found time to think about Russia. As America leaves Iraq, they may find 
more time to think about Russia, and the Russians know that. They are very worried. The 
North Caucasus is close by and they are fearful about their continued hold on this part of 
the world.
111
 
 
Today, there are newly erected skyscrapers in Grozny, and Chechnya appears a less 
likely source of conflict in comparison to Dagestan and Ingushetia.  Nevertheless, 
Russia’s sizeable Muslim minorities, who are majorities in their areas, may once again 
agitate to be free from Moscow’s dominion.  
Moscow was not wont to entertain Western concerns over the brutality of its 
campaigns in Chechnya, arguing that it had a right to sovereignty in dealing with the 
issue.  “For Moscow, the West’s criticisms of Russian behavior never seemed to take 
account of the threat the Chechen militants posed to the territorial integrity of the Russian 
state. [...] Moscow became frustrated over the West’s emphasis on human rights in the 
light of the terrorists’ own brutality in Beslan and elsewhere.”112  When the September 
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11
th
 terrorist attacks occurred, Putin was vindicated in his argument that Islamic terrorism 
was not just a Russian problem.  He thus aligned Russia with America’s Global War on 
Terror.  Putin’s speeches consistently sought to link Russia’s problem in Chechnya with 
Islamic radicals to America’s, implying that the US approach to dealing with the issue 
(war) should make the Russian approach in Chechnya be seen as appropriate 
internationally.  Moreover, there was public support among Russian citizens for the US 
invasion of Afghanistan.
113
 
For Russia, a major benefit of the new partnership with the United States was the 
US-led efforts to disrupt terror network financing.  However by 2003, when the Iraq War 
began, relations between Moscow and Washington had again fallen apart.  Sergei Lavrov, 
the Russian prime minister, remarked in 2003 that introducing democracy is both 
impossible and dangerous.
114
  Russia soured on the United States approach to dealing 
with Islamic radicalization, particularly those groups in the Middle East that Russia views 
the US and its allies as having stirred up through their actions.  Bowker explains that 
from past Russian experiences in Tajikistan, Moscow learned that by making Islamic 
groups participate in government they will begin finding practical solutions to political 
problems and moderate.
115
  Thus, this is the approach Russia advocates in dealing with 
Palestinian groups and their desire to combat Israel using terrorism. 
In his 2009 book, Primakov emphasizes that while Russia works with the 
Palestinian groups, they have always denounced terrorism as a method for achieving 
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policy outcomes.
116
  He argues that while Yasser Arafat was never enamored by 
terrorism as a strategy, it was Russia that convinced him to publicly denounce 
terrorism.
117
  Nizameddin notes that as early as 1992 Russia had even abandoned its 
support for non-state militants in the region.
118
 
Comparing Russia’s terrorism list to that of the United States uncovers several 
interesting juxtapositions.  Obviously the United States views Iran as a state sponsor of 
terrorism while Russia does not.  However, the United States lists the Mujahedeen e 
Khalq (MeK) as a terrorist organization (despite working with the group in Iraq) while 
Russia does not.  Further, Russia lists the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt as a terrorist 
organization, while the United States does not.  The United States considers Hamas and 
Hezbollah terrorist organizations, and formerly considered Fatah and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization as such, while Russia has never labeled as terrorist any of these 
groups.  While both states list al Qaeda as a terrorist organization, Russia lists the Taliban 
of Afghanistan as such as well while the United States does not.  The United States does 
not label Hizb ut Tahrir a terrorist organization, which Russia does.  The United States 
does call the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorists, while Russia does not.   
The differences in Russia’s terrorism list and the United States’ are interesting in 
that they seem to reveal a pattern in which an organization does not draw Russia’s 
attention until in runs counter to Russia’s geostrategic interests.  While this is not 
necessarily untrue for the United States, it does seem to be less obvious.  For example, 
Turkey and Russia have discussed the problem of Kurdish terrorism, yet Russia does not 
                                                 
116
 Primakov, Russia and the Arabs, 16. 
117
 Ibid, 222. 
118
 Nizameddin, Russia and the Middle East, 121. 
 41 
 
designate the PKK a terrorist group because they provide useful leverage in holding 
Turkey to commitments to not aid Chechen separatists.  The Global Post, reporting on 
Russia’s list, noted the politicization of Russia’s terrorist label:  
Amidst the Abu Sayyafs and Al-Qaedas and various Somali groups etc, there are some 
interesting Russia-specific entries. Namely: a bunch of nationalist groups, some of which 
have been tolerated by the government, even as they are formally banned. That includes: 
the Slavic Union and DPNI. A new group, Russians, formed in May by former leaders of 
the Slavic Union and DPNI doesn’t make the list. But also on it? The National Bolshevik 
Party, headed by opposition favorite Eduard Limonov
119
 
 
The blatant domestic politicization reinforces the assertion the Moscow uses the terrorist 
label for groups abroad when it is advantageous.   
Arms Transfers 
Arms transfers have a legacy in the Middle East as making up the basis of an 
alliance with Russia.  Throughout the Cold War, Moscow was the key supplier of 
weapons to Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Libya, North Yemen and South Yemen. The 
physical presence of Soviet military advisors signaled to the United States and others 
Moscow’s commitment to its patrons as well.  Since then, the murky business of weapons 
transfers has become the subject of conspiratorial explanations of Russian actions in the 
region, including with Syria today.
120
   In this section’s analysis data from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute will be used extensively.
121122
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The Russian arms industry went through the same period of contraction in the 
1990s as most other Russian industries.
123
  Russia took up a smaller share of worldwide 
arms transfers, and its production for domestic consumption dropped as Russia shrunk its 
military spending.  Beginning in 1999 the volume of arms transfers rebounded, and since 
has remained high.  From 1999 to 2011, Russia ranks second among worldwide arms 
exporters (valued by SIPRI’s TIV at $72 billion), trailing only the United States ($95.8 
billion), and far outpacing third place Germany ($24.8 billion).  The following is a chart 
of Russian arms transfers (using SIPRI’s TIV) from 1992 to 2011: 
 
Figure 2: Annual worldwide Russian arms transfers since 1992  
Ascribing purpose to Russian arms transfers in the absence of the obvious Cold 
War context is difficult.  There are certainly political considerations that are made in 
evaluating whether or not to make weapons deals.  However, arms transfer partnerships 
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do not necessarily create stronger allies; often, the strength of an alliance determines 
Russia’s willingness to transfer arms.  In other instances, Russia is the preferred exporter 
because the state has purchased Russian weapons in the past which could not share an 
interface with another state’s weapons.  States can assert influence leveraging weapons 
transfers either by offering additional weapons as an incentive or by threatening to reduce 
transfers.  Or, as Freedman explains in the case of Russia, Syria, and Israel, potential 
unwanted arms sales to a rival state can serve as an inducement for a non-ally.
124
 
Another large motivator for Russian arms transfers that is difficult to measure is 
the desire of Russian arms dealers to make money.  Russian arms smuggler Viktor Bout 
made a fortune selling mostly small arms, which SIPRI does not even measure.  The 
oligarchs of Putin’s inner circle, who make millions of dollars, are both aggressive and 
influential in pushing for increased weapons export agreements.
125
  In late 2011, Russia 
reached an agreement to supply fighter planes to Syria for $550 million, which while not 
affecting the health of the Russian economy, is critical to several men of Putin’s inner 
circle who pocket the bulk of the profit from that transaction.  Thus, the Russians speak 
of arms transfers to Syria as though it were just another business transaction.  
Domestically, both United Shipbuilding Corporation and United Aircraft Corporation 
have been denied requests to challenge Rosoboronexport’s monopoly on negotiating 
transfers of weapons systems.
126
 
                                                 
124
 Freedman, “Russia, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Putin Years,” 60. 
125
 Bruno Sergi, Misinterpreting Modern Russia, (New York: Continuum, 2009), 105. 
126
 Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley, Pieter D. Wezeman, and Siemon T. Wezeman, “International Arms 
Transfers,” In SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, disarmament and international security, 271-318, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 278. 
 44 
 
Considering the Russian arms industry from a business perspective, India and 
China are Russia’s two largest customers (after Russia itself), and South East Asia offers 
the most appealing growing market.
127
  However, the technology of Russian weapons is 
lagging, such that Russia must be concerned that India and China could soon produce 
weapons of an equal quality domestically.  Thus, it is Asia that will shape the future of 
the Russian arms industry, not the Middle East, which Russia assumes will remain a 
steady buyer regardless of its competitiveness.
128
 
The United States transfers more arms into the Middle East than Russia, as 
depicted in the following chart, which shows Russian arms transfers versus United States 
arms transfers to the 22 Arab League states, Iran, Turkey, and Israel.  Again, SIPRI’s 
Trend Indicator Value system is used, which produces figures in 1990 millions of dollars. 
 
Figure 3: Annual US and Russian arms transfers to the Middle East since 2000 
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From 2000 to 2011, the United States total arms transfers to the Middle East (adjusting to 
2011 dollars) are valued at $46.09 billion, doubling Russia’s total value of $22.763 
billion.  As the chart shows, Russia was actually the larger exporter in 2010.  Further, 
because Russia is associated with less democratic states for its overall arms exports, it 
might seem surprising that the United States actually increased its arms transfers amidst 
the 2011 Arab Spring.  The states that dramatically increased their US weapons imports 
in 2011 are Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Turkey, and UAE.  A chart of year by 
year, country by country figures of Russian and US arms transfers is included as 
Appendix A.  
Arms transfers to the Middle East made up 18.8% of worldwide Russian arms 
transfers from 2000 onward, although toward the end of the decade that figure began 
increasing, going as high as 34.1% in 2010.  Algeria is the largest recipient of Russian 
arms transfers in the region.  It ranks third internationally behind China and India, 
importing $1.187 billion in 2011 (adjusted to 2011 dollar value), its lowest total since 
2007.  Much of the weaponry that Algeria receives can be used for purposes of fighting 
internal enemies, especially armored vehicles.  Algiers is also purchasing large quantities 
of Russian airplanes and missiles.   
Syria and Iran are also subjects of controversy.
129
  In actuality, Syria received 
minimal Russian arms transfers until 2007.  As with Iraq, over the last few decades Syria 
simply could not afford to purchase new weapons and Russia, with a new found sense of 
pragmatism, saw there was no reason to loan Syria money to buy Russian weapons that 
they could not afford.  In the Cold War the value of keeping a state in Moscow’s camp 
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justified that action.  Since then it does not.  SIPRI’s data from 2000-2011 puts Algerian 
arms transfers at $5.66 billion dollars; over the same time frame Syria received $0.863 
billion dollars’ worth of arms, with 84% of that coming in 2009-2011.  Qualitatively, 
Russia has been careful not to sell Syria weapons that could alter the strategic balance 
between Syria and Israel, as related in an anecdote from Robert Freedman: 
In an almost classic case of political opportunism, Bashar al-Asad seized upon the 
Russian invasion of Georgia - and the fact that Israel (along with Germany, France, the 
United States and Turkey) had provided military equipment and training to the Georgian 
military - to try to convince the reluctant Russians to sell Syria the weapons it had long 
coveted but so tar failed to succeed in buying. These included the short-range, solid-fuel 
Iskander-E ground-to-ground missile that could reach virtually every target in Israel; 
MiG-31 combat aircraft; and the SAM-300 antiaircraft missile system, which, if installed 
near Damascus, could cover most of Israel's airspace.
130
 
 
Iran however is a major buyer, the second largest in the region.  It has acquired 
$1.636 billion dollars’ worth of arms since 2000, about a seventh of the total transfers 
into the region from Russia, although Russia has demonstrated restraint from selling Iran 
everything that it wants.  Kenneth Pollack wrote that as a CIA analyst, it was striking to 
realize that Iran’s arms purchases following the Iran-Iraq war were not weapons that 
would be useful in a future war with Iraq, but those that would be useful in a future war 
with the United States.
131
  Today, Iran wants missiles capable of assaulting the US 
Navy’s Fifth Fleet, stationed in the Persian Gulf.  But in 2005 Russia refused to sell Iran 
submarine-launched missiles.
132
  In 2010 Russia cancelled its contract to sell Iran the S-
300 air defense missiles at the behest of the United States.
133
  This supports Freedman’s 
assertion that Russia has a growing understanding that a decline in American standing in 
                                                 
130
 Freedman, “Russia, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Putin Years,” 60. 
131
 Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle : the Conflict between Iran and America (New York: Random 
House, 2004). 
132
 Freedman, “Can Russia be a Partner for NATO in the Middle East?” 140. 
133
 Holtom, “International Arms Transfers,” 272. 
 47 
 
the Middle East does not necessarily benefit Russia.
134
  While Russia is selling large 
volumes of weapons to the Iran-Syria alliance, those weapons are not the ones that have 
ended up in the hands of those state’s affiliates.  Instead, it is Iranian manufactured 
missiles and explosively formed penetrators that have been causing problems for the 
United States and its allies in the region. 
Possibly more important than the arms that it is selling is the assistance Russia is 
providing Iran in bringing the Bushehr nuclear reactor on line.  This endeavor is not 
included in the SIPRI database; both parties maintain that the goal is to provide energy 
only.  If an agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue can be reached where Russia supplies 
Iran enriched uranium and removes the spent plutonium waste, the arrangement would be 
lucrative for Moscow.  At the same time, Russia has explained to the Arab Gulf states 
that if they would like Russian assistance in building peaceful nuclear power plants, 
Russia would be willing to help.   
Interestingly, Dmitry Shlopentokh notes that the Saudi’s have considered a 
strategy of buying up Russian weapons simply so that Iran cannot, although this 
prospective plan seems flawed in that Russia has the potential to increase its production 
and supply arms to both.
135
  Russia would like to sell arms to Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and 
Oman, all wealthy states that would not carry the risk of defaulting on loans.  Syria, Iraq, 
Iran, and Egypt have all become debtors of Russia at some point, and have had loans 
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forgiven.  Moscow hopes that by improving the quality of its weapons, it will find 
wealthier customers. 
Iraq does not appear as a buyer of Russian weapons from 1990 until 2006.  While 
this underscores a flaw of the SIPRI data (relying on open source intelligence), it does 
show that Russia generally honored United Nations Security Council sanctions 
prohibiting the sale of weapons to Iraq.  Bowker writes that the United States suspected 
Russia of working around the Oil for Food program by providing contraband in exchange 
for kickbacks, but he does not offer any proof.
136
   
Finally, Israel is both a critical partner and competitor for the Russian arms 
industry.  While Russia has the capabilities to build aircraft and other equipment second 
to only the United States, they are lagging behind in technological sophistication.  So, 
Israel will install advanced computer systems on Russian weaponry to raise its 
desirability.  Katz gives the specific example of fighter planes sold to India.
137
   
The one concrete agreement to come out of the [October 2006] Moscow talks was the 
formation of a working group to coordinate arms sales to third countries.  While Russia 
and Israel have cooperated in the production of weapons systems such as the AWACS, 
the two countries competed for contracts to refurbish old Soviet equipment like the MIG-
23 aircraft.
138
   
 
Further, Mark Katz has said that Russia buys Israeli Unmanned Aerial Vehicles that they 
lack the sophistication to produce.
139
  Russia has announced that it will maintain high 
levels of military spending through 2020 with a focus research and development and 
acquisitions.
140
  If domestic demand boosts the quality of Russian arms products, Russia 
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could become a preferred supplier in the Middle East, where currently buying top of the 
line means buying American. 
 Russia is not a callous state simply looking to turn profits by arming 
authoritarians in the Middle East.  Nor is it interested in creating instability.  If either of 
those goals were real, Moscow would sell Syria advanced air defense systems and Iran 
advanced coastal defense systems.  There is a definite profit motivation, but it does not 
overwhelm strategic considerations.  The United States dramatically increased its 2011 
arms transfers to the region while Russia reduced theirs; a point ignored by many 
contemporary commentators.  Russian arms transfers to the region are strong and 
growing, and should be viewed more as a straightforward business than as a shadowy 
illicit market. 
Energy Resources 
While Russian arms transfers do bring substantial profits to select oligarchs in 
Russia, they pale in comparison to the wealth brought in by oil and natural gas sales, 
which essentially buoy the economy.  A major accomplishment of Putin’s early years was 
that through energy resource exports he was able to build up the Reserve Fund and the 
National Wealth Fund, which combined to nearly $98 billion at the end of 2008, and 
which became critical during the economic downturn of 2008.
141
  Currently the funds 
hold reserves of about $55 billion.
142
  Much of the focus on Russia’s energy resources is 
on what has been referred to as Pipeline Politics, where Russia uses its near-monopoly as 
                                                 
141
 Data taken from the Russian Ministry of Finance, available at 
http://www1.minfin.ru/en/nationalwealthfund/ and http://www1.minfin.ru/en/reservefund/ (accessed April 
10, 2012). 
142
 Ibid. 
 50 
 
a natural gas supplier to Europe as a political tool.  This section will discuss how the 
Middle East factors into Russia’s Pipeline Politics, as well as Russian collaboration with 
the Middle East on oil exports.  
Russia exported 223 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2010.
143
  Canada, 
Norway, and Qatar all exported about 100 billion cubic meters in 2010, and no other 
country topped 60 billion cubic meters.
144
  Natural gas is best transported through 
pipelines, with the exclusion of liquefied natural gas (LNG); shipping it, as is done with 
oil, is unfeasible.  LNG tends to be three to five times more expensive than natural gas 
transported via pipeline.  Thus, understanding Pipeline Politics must begin with 
observing the geography of where the transit lines lie.  
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Figure 4: Map of Europe’s natural gas pipeline network145 
In January 2006, Russia cut off natural gas to Ukraine in order to gain political 
leverage.   As can be seen from the map, every natural gas pipeline that runs into Europe 
runs through Ukraine first.  So in January 2006 much of Europe came to realize that their 
supply of gas could be disrupted by disputes between Russia and its immediate 
neighbors. 
 For Western and Central Europe, there were and are essentially three ways to 
work around this problem.  The first option is that Europe could ban together and make 
clear to Russia that withholding natural gas supplies is an unacceptable method for 
conducting statecraft.  Few in Western Europe preferred this confrontational option.  The 
second option is that new pipelines could be built to bypass Eastern Europe, allowing 
Russian gas to reach hubs in Italy and Germany without going through Eastern Europe.  
This option was Russia’s preference, as well as the general preference of Western and 
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Central European countries.  Thus, Russia and others have begun the construction of the 
Nord Stream Pipeline and the South Stream Pipeline, two routes that accomplish this 
goal.  The third option is to build pipelines that bring natural gas from non-Russian fields 
to Europe without transiting Russian territory.  This option is the preference of Eastern 
Europe and the United States, among others, and the result is the proposed Nabucco 
Pipeline, shown in better detail on the map below.  
 
Figure 5: Map of the proposed Nabucco Pipeline
146
 
Russia detests this project for obvious regions.  If a reliable pipeline can be built that 
connects Europe to the gas fields of Iran, Qatar, Iraq, and Azerbaijan, than the Russian 
monopoly on natural gas would be broken.  Turkey would stand to profit as the key 
transit state.  Russia has taken actions against the possible Nabucco pipeline; Gazprom 
bought a majority share in the hub in Baumgarten, Austria that would act as the spigot at 
the end of the pipeline.  Some have suggested that a cause of the 2008 Russian invasion 
of Georgia was destroying the pipeline that could connect Azerbaijan’s gas fields to the 
                                                 
146
 Map taken from “Russia: If we can’t own the pipeline, we’ll control the faucet,” Transatlantic Politics, 
June 2, 2007, http://www.transatlanticpolitics.com/2007/06/02/russia-if-we-cant-own-the-pipeline-well-
control-the-faucet/ (accessed February 15, 2012). 
 53 
 
Nabucco pipeline; they at least attempted to shell it (but the pipeline is underground and 
the Russians missed their target).  Even so, Russia certainly demonstrated the instability 
of that transit route. 
 Thus Iran, Qatar, Iraq, and Turkey are critical states to Russia’s Pipeline Politics.  
The combination of Russia, Iran, Qatar, Venezuela, and Algeria controls 73% of the 
world’s natural gas reserves.  Because of Qatar’s geography and the sanctions that Iran 
faces, neither are able to take advantage of the large North Field reserve the two countries 
share.  This point partially underscores why Russia is not motivated to bring about an end 
to sanctions against Iran; so long as Iran is a pariah, it will not be a source for the 
Nabucco pipeline project.  Further, Hunter writes that Russia beat out Iran with its bid to 
become Turkey’s main gas supplier.147  When Iran and Qatar eventually become stable 
producers, they could form a sort of Gas OPEC with Russia and its allies Venezuela and 
Algeria, controlling prices worldwide.  Qatar is the key state that could potentially remain 
independent of such a cartel.  Katz notes, “While we in the West worry about Russia’s 
becoming the dominant gas supplier to Europe as a whole, Russia worries about little 
Qatar, as well as others—Algeria, Libya—encroaching on markets in Eastern Europe that 
Russia has dominated until now.”148  That concern is merited, given Qatar’s willingness 
to follow an independent course of foreign policy regarding Syria despite Russian 
pressure during the Arab Spring.  In 2010, Qatar signed a deal to supply Poland with 
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liquefied natural gas, covering about 10% of their gas consumption, encroaching on what 
had previously been a complete Russian monopoly.
149
  
 Turkey has a different role.  Currently Turkey is a customer of Russian natural 
gas, receiving “roughly three quarters of its fuel and energy resources from Russia.”150  If 
it were to become a transit state for natural gas from the Caspian Sea region, as well as a 
consumer, it could significantly reduce the expense of natural gas.  The incentive to 
undertake the Nabucco project is restrained by Russian pressure and the high investment 
cost of constructing the pipeline, which could be undertaken by private companies and 
other governments.  Russia would rather see the Blue Stream Pipeline, which runs from 
Beregovaya, Russia to Durusu, Turkey under the Black Sea, added to in order to create a 
new route to transport Russian gas.  Freedman describes interest between Russia and 
Israel in 1997 and 2006 to build a pipeline from Turkey on to Israel so that Russia can 
sell its natural gas to Israel.
151
  However recent discoveries of offshore LNG in Israel 
should end that possibility.
152
 
 In 1999, Criss and Guner wrote an article that describes Russia as extremely 
concerned by the possible role of Turkey in reducing Moscow’s ability to control and 
profit from Caspian Sea energy resources.  They also emphasize the United States role, 
writing “it could appear that the USA is setting a barrier against Iran and Russia to 
prevent them from gaining the biggest share of the Caspian resources.  Turkey is a key 
part of this barrier and a trump card against Iran – why should the USA not encourage it 
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to penetrate into the region?”153  The article views Turkey, Russia, and Iran as 
competitors to exploit the Caspian Sea resources, but argues that whichever state the 
United States allies with and supports will be the ultimate winner, especially if it chooses 
Iran.   
However, thirteen years removed, that possibility looks farfetched, and at the 
same time the relationship between Ankara and Moscow has grown more cooperative.  
China has also become involved in efforts to unlock Caspian energy resources.  Thus, 
while Russia was formerly competing with Iran and Turkey for supremacy in the 
Caspian, the arrival of the United States and China as players has made Russia more 
willing to work with Iran and Turkey.  However in a literal sense energy resources in the 
Caspian have remained unexploited throughout the past decade, as the various sides 
continue to jockey for how large each state’s share of resources should be. 
 The other major natural resource enriching the Russian economy is oil.  Russia 
has the 7th largest proven reserves, and is the traditionally the second largest exporter of 
crude oil, although in 2010 oil exports surpassed those of Saudi Arabia.
154
  While Russia 
and Saudi Arabia were exporting in excess of 7.5 million barrels per day in 2010, no 
other country topped 3 million barrels per day.
155
  Russia’s behavior is exemplified by a 
2003 article appearing in Petroleum Economist which explained that  
Russia's declared policy is to boost oil exports, particularly to the US, where, until 2001, 
its Urals crude was hardly seen. US disenchantment with its main supplier, Saudi Arabia, 
since 11 September 2002 has played into Russian hands and the invasion of US oil 
markets has begun in earnest. Deliveries across the Atlantic reached a record 400,000 b/d 
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in June [2003], thanks mainly to the disappearance of Iraqi oil. US refiners have adapted 
to Russian Urals, traders say, and the door is opening for larger supplies.
156
 
 
Russia has declined Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
membership, and further has not been a reliable partner to the organization in 
manipulating world prices.  Often, when OPEC has slowed production in order to boost 
prices, Russia has shown no restraint in its own production, even boosting its production 
at times to capitalize on higher prices. 
 Hunter describes the situation as one in which Saudi Arabia is a swing producer, 
able to easily alter its production to effect global oil prices.  Saudi Arabia is able to take 
on this role because it does not need the money.  Russia does, and therefore continues to 
increase its exports in all circumstances. “Russia lacks flexibility, but it is capable of 
disrupting the oil markets and undermining OPEC’s influence on setting oil prices.”157  
The two states are improving their cooperation in one regard; in 2007 Lukoil won a 
contract to develop the Saudi gas field at Rub al-Khali, which Katz attributes to 
negotiations with Western countries failing to reach agreement.
158
  
 Russia has been involved for bidding on Oil refinement contracts in Iraq.  Before 
the 2003 US invasion, Russia signed an agreement with Iraq to develop West Qurna II 
petroleum.
159
  Hussein canceled the contract in the lead up to the Iraq War when Russia 
sought assurances that the contract would be honored if he was overthrown.  
Nevertheless, the Russians want that contract honored and have been actively bidding to 
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take part in the reconstruction of the Iraqi oil industry.
160
  Their concern is that the United 
States is using its position to lock Russia out.  Currently Lukoil has a 56.25% stake in the 
West Qurna II oil field, and Gazprom has a 30% stake in the Badra gas field, for which 
annual Gross Revenue at Plateau production are valued at $425 million and $100 million 
respectively.
161
 
 One point of contention between Turkey and Russia has been shipping oil through 
the Bosporus Straits.  Turkey is concerned about the possible environmental and 
economic ramifications of a shipping accident of a Russian oil tanker.  Russia wants to 
increase its volume of shipping beyond its current level.  While the issue is still 
unresolved, it does not appear that the matter will derail relations in any meaningful way. 
 Under Putin Russia’s energy interests have merged with its geostrategic interests, 
especially on issues regarding the transit of gas to Europe.  For this reason, the energy 
sector is closely associated with the Russian leadership, and can be viewed as indicative 
of general state relations.  The Arab Gulf States, with which Russia has struggled to 
create strong political relations, do not enjoy Russia’s cooperation on manipulating the 
price of crude oil.  However that disregard has benefited Russia, as it continues to enjoy 
higher prices for its oil exports.  Russia, through Gazprom, successfully guarded its 
dominant position as a natural gas supplier over the past decade, and appears well 
positioned to defend that position into the next decade.      
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General Trade 
 Increasing economic strength is a key goal of Russian foreign policy.  As was 
discussed in chapter two, improving the economic well-being of citizens is necessary for 
Moscow to avoid domestic scrutiny over its leadership.  The 2008 Foreign Policy 
Concept identifies diversifying economic relations away from Europe as in the national 
interest, thus the Middle East is a region that should see increased trade.
162
  The two 
preceding sections showed that there has been some economization of foreign policy on 
arms dealings and oil and gas exports.
163
   
Whatever ‘opportunities’ that appeared to be at hand were seized, even when the 
consequences of such actions were likely to be negative… Just as the transfer of state-of-
the-art military technology and weapons to China arose not out of careful calculations of 
its implications, but owed itself to short-term economic and geopolitical considerations – 
increasing export revenue, propping up the military-industrial complex, firing a shot 
across the West’s bows in the global multipolar game.164   
 
Russia prioritizes the continuation of expanding trade with Turkey, despite their disputes 
over issues ranging from support of Chechens to Bosporus Strait shipping to the Kurdish 
question.
165
  Bowker notes that as worried as Russia is by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 
eccentric quotes and actions, a desire to maintain trade with Iran remains constant.
166
 
 According to the CIA’s World Factbook, Russia’s GDP was about $1.7 trillion as 
of 2011, although when GDP is measured by purchasing power parity the figure is $2.3 
trillion.
167
  Total foreign exports in 2010 were $400.4 billion, and 2011 that number 
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reached $498.6 billion.
168
  By comparison, total foreign exports were around $105.6 
billion in 2000.
169
  The explosion in foreign trade began in 2003.  At the same time, 
Russia’s imports in 2010 were $191.8 billion, and increased to $310.1 billion in 2011.170  
Trade differences of $100 billion have become commonplace for Russia since 2003, 
going as high as $150 billion in 2008 and bottoming out at only $92 billion in 2009.
171
  
The majority of Russian exports are to Europe, approaching half of all exports 
when using the IMF’s definition of Euro Area, which includes the United States, Japan, 
and South Korea.  About 6.62% of Russian exports are to the Middle East, which totaled 
$26.5 billion in 2010.  Turkey is by far Russia’s largest trading partner in the region, 
having increased its Russian imports from 2003 to 2008 six fold, from $4.75 billion to 
$27.44 billion.
172
  Only the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy traded more with Russia that 
year.  Even after the 2008 recession, Turkey’s trade with Russia matches that of the rest 
of the Middle East combined.   
For 2010 imports from Russia, Turkey is followed by Iran ($3.36 billion), Israel 
($1.68 billion), Egypt ($1.76 billion), Algeria ($1.27 billion), and Syria ($1.10 billion).
173
  
Morocco and Tunisia are also strong trading partners, given their size.  What stands out is 
the lack of trade with the Gulf States.  Exports to Bahrain and Qatar amount to only a few 
million dollars annually.  While UAE and Saudi Arabia import more from Russia than 
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the other Gulf States ($886 million and $298 million respectively in 2010), they purchase 
less relative to their GDPs than others in the region.
174
   
For imports, Russia relies much less on the Middle East, and the gap between 
Turkey and the rest of the region is even larger.  In 2010, Russia imported $273.6 billion.  
The Middle East accounted for $7 billion of that trade, or 2.56%.
175
  Turkey accounted 
for $4.88 billion of the Middle East’s portion, a 70% share.  Other major exporters to 
Russia were Israel ($773 million), Morocco ($374 million), Iran ($272 million), and 
Egypt ($271 million).
176
  Combined, those five states account for about 94% of Russian 
imports from the Middle East.  Much of what Russia is exporting is machinery, raw 
materials like rare metals and chemicals, and petroleum products.
177
 
Currently, Russia is seeking to increase trade with the Gulf States.  In 2007 Putin 
said that the motivation for arms sales and other trade with Iran was mostly pragmatic, 
implying that Russia would welcome increased trade with the Arab Gulf despite possible 
ramifications with Iran.
178
  Shlapentokh writes “this could well be the reason for the 
generally increasing trade between the Gulf States and Russia, and, in general, the good 
relations between Russia and some of the Gulf States, such as Qatar.”179  Increasing 
advanced manufacturing and production is a goal in the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, 
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and the Gulf States have the financial capabilities to invest in Russia’s high-tech 
industry.
180
  
 Israel is already a crucial partner of Russia in the high-tech industry.  The two 
countries have a checkered political history, but relations began improving in 1997 when 
Israel gave Russia a $50 million agricultural loan.
181
  Freedman notes that by the early 
2000s trade between the two had risen to $1 billion annually, to $2 billion by 2006, and 
the two countries have set a goal of increasing trade to $5 billion.
182
  Israel represents the 
largest community of Russian speakers outside of the former Soviet Union as a result of 
mass immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, and the success of those Soviet Jews in Israeli 
business serves as the platform for strong cooperation. 
 Russian tourists flock to three Middle Eastern countries in droves: Egypt, Turkey, 
and Israel.  In 2007, Turkey was the top destination for Russian tourists, and Egypt 
placed as the third most frequently visited international destination.
183
  While the number 
of Russian vacationers to Turkey at 1.5 million in 2007, Turkey’s Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism claimed 3.2 million Russian visitors through the first nine months of 2011.
184
  In 
Egypt, Russians are the second largest tourist group, approaching one million annually.  
The United Arab Emirates and Tunisia also placed among the top twenty tourist 
destinations for Russians in 2006.  Morocco hopes to increase Russian visitors to 2 
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million annually by 2020.
185
  Russians are the second most frequent visitors to Israel, 
trailing only the United States, as of 2011.
186
 
Influence over Former Soviet Spaces 
 The next two components of Russian foreign policy in the Middle East—
Influence within the CIS and Russia’s great power status—differ substantively from the 
previous four.  Both are difficult to quantify, reliant on perception and influence rather 
than measurable action.  The previous components were referred to as pragmatic because 
they were less dependent on Russia’s overarching foreign policy goals.  These two 
abstract components dovetail with Russia’s main international relations priorities of 
holding dominion over former Soviet states and earning the respect of the West. 
 Historically Iran and Turkey competed with Russia for influence in Central Asia.  
Even in Soviet times, Moscow was concerned that its Muslim states were susceptible to 
nefarious Turkish and Persian machinations.  The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, and 
the accompanying zeal for spreading revolution, was especially alarming.  In some ways 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was meant to curtail the spread of Islamic fervor, but 
this ultimately backfired and Afghanistan became a rallying point for the radical Islamic 
movement, as well as a new fulcrum for Saudi influence. 
 When the Soviet Union collapsed, Turkey sought to connect with the newly 
formed states on the basis of a shared Turkish ethnicity,
187
 while Iran tried to leverage its 
Islamic credentials.  At the same time, radicalized Sunni Arabs, backed by Gulf wealth, 
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were floating about Central Asia.  Moscow succeeded in creating regimes that kept the 
new states tied to Russia, namely the Commonwealth of Independent States and the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization, however Mankoff notes that Russia has long 
struggled to find non-military means to influence these states.
188
   
 NATO also began involvement with former Soviet states through individual 
security cooperation programs in the early 1990s.  Russia, having seen numerous former 
allies defecting to the West, was concerned that the Washington’s strategy was to 
surround it by pro-Western states.  This began a shift in Moscow from viewing Turkey 
and Iran as the primary rivals for influence over CIS states to viewing them as potential 
allies for keeping out Western influence.  Moscow sought to rally against Western values 
like universal moralism.
189
  “Even if a disparate Islam lacked the political unity and sense 
of purpose of, say, China, India, or the European Union, it might help Russia to mitigate 
the consequences of American power projection and Western moral universalism.”190  As 
evidence of changing geostrategic calculations, in 1999 Criss and Guner wrote, “The 
expected benefits from competition between Russia, Turkey, and Iran have clearly 
diminished, making conflict between them less likely.”191 
Iran and Russia, having begun rapprochement in 1989 following the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, began cooperating on security issues in the Caucuses in the early 
1990s.
192
  But the major test of collaboration between Moscow and Tehran was 
addressing conflict in Tajikistan in the mid-1990s.  Tajikistan became a center of Islamic 
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radicalization, particularly in the form of Hizb ut-Tahrir, which spread to Central Asia 
from Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
193
  Tetsuro Iji explains 
Russia and Iran were at the centre of international efforts at mediating the Tajik conflict, 
having special ties with the government and opposition, respectively. Russia was the 
guarantor of the survival of the Rakhmonov regime in both economic and military terms, 
whereas Iran has cultural and linguistic affinities with Tajikistan and was the major 
foreign supporter of the Islamic opposition. Thus the two countries possessed a powerful 
source of leverage over their respective clients, and the corresponding interest and 
cooperation between them was the key to progress in the peace process.
194
 
 
While both sides came to desire a political resolution over several years’ time, it was the 
Taliban’s takeover of Kabul that was the catalyst for reaching a final solution.195  These 
events helped precipitate the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, then 
known as the Shanghai five, to which Iran gained observer status in 2005.
196
  
The American invasion of Afghanistan furthered the trends that began to appear 
in the mid- to late-1990s.  Putin decided to support the United States in their invasion of 
Afghanistan, pressuring CIS neighbors to allow US bases against the advice of his inner 
circle.  Critics were not confined to Moscow: “A number of Turkish foreign policy 
experts suggest that Ankara’s strategic perspective on Central Asia is much closer to the 
Russian position than to that of the United States. ‘Neither Moscow nor Ankara is happy 
to see U.S. forces in the region,’ wrote analyst Semih Idiz.”197  As the United States war 
in Afghanistan wore on and Russia was receiving no benefits for its hospitality in 
allowing bases in Central Asia, Moscow changed course.  The Iraq War, launched against 
Russia’s consent in 2003, deepened the transition.  Nizameddin notes also that Moscow 
                                                 
193
 Bowker, Russia, America and the Islamic World, 147. 
194
 Tetsuro Iji, “Cooperation, Coordination and Complementarity in International Peacemaking: the 
Tajikistan Experience,” International Peacekeeping 12, no. 2 (2005): 192. 
195
 Ibid, 193. 
196
 Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 216-218. 
197
 Warhola and Mitchell, “The Warming of Turkish-Russian Relations,” 139. 
 65 
 
and Tehran were equally indignant at United States efforts to militarize and dominate the 
Gulf.
198
  Thus by 2004 the shift toward better cooperation in Central Asia between 
Moscow, Tehran, and Ankara was solidified. 
Despite the limitations on Iran’s conduct of foreign policy placed upon it by the 
United States, the Russian view is that Iran is a strong state that can defend itself against 
American hostility.  At the same time, Russia is concerned that the United States and Iran 
might one day find rapprochement, pulling Iran away from partnership with Russia.  
Mankoff notes that Russia knows Iran will be an unstable ally going forward.
199
  Yet 
Iran’s belligerence suits Russia in that it provides Russia with the upper hand in the 
relationship.  Shlapentokh writes “the Russian elite would be [displeased] if Iran were to 
play an equal or, even worse, leading role in the Russian/Iranian geo-political 
arrangements.”200 While Turkmenistan is in talks with Iran about exporting gas reserves, 
as the section on energy resources made clear, such an agreement will likely not come at 
the detriment of Russia.
201
   
Warholla and Mitchell pinpoint 2004 as the year in which relations between 
Russia and Turkey saw marked improvement.
202
  This roughly coincides with the rise to 
Prime Minister by Recep Tayyip Erdoĝan, who exchanged visits with Vladimir Putin.  In 
fact Erdoĝan has made eight visits to Russia since 2005.  2004 was also when new trade 
agreements were being reached between Ankara and Moscow.  Turkey, because of its 
secular identity, does not rely on Islam for gaining influence in the Muslim areas of the 
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former Soviet Union.
203
  Its NATO membership makes up much of its appeal to other 
states as a patron.  Partly for this reason, while many of the Russian elite favor Turkey, 
the military views Turkey as a key rival.
204
  “Turkish and Russian officials increasingly 
refer to their respective countries as two great Eurasian powers, indicating that Turkish 
and Russia versions of Eurasianism need not be competitive.  Rather, they can be 
complementary.”205   
Turkey also has a significant population of Chechens, and as was explained in the 
terrorism section, halting any support for the Chechen separatists is a primary objective 
of Russian foreign policy.  Moscow has shown restraint in its position regarding the 
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).  Russia could easily reciprocate against perceived hostile 
Turkish actions in Chechnya and elsewhere by supporting the Kurds.  This is not 
unfeasible; Primakov describes throughout his book a longstanding connection with Iraqi 
Kurds, which Moscow supported against Saddam Hussein.
206
  Conversely, the inability of 
the United States to keep what Turkey calls “Kurdish Terrorists” from operating out of 
northern Iraq has dampened that relationship.
207
  This point of leverage helps Moscow 
assure Ankara’s cooperation. 
China has also become a growing factor in Central Asia over the past several 
years.  While Chinese and Russian policies on the Middle East and Central generally 
align, Russia is unhappy with Beijing’s growing influence.208  The only major instance of 
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Russian and Chinese policy positions colliding was Russia’s decision to cooperate with 
the United States in allowing forward operating bases in Central Asia, to which China 
objected.  Thus, Russia’s concern with China’s growing presence in Central Asia is 
predicated on the potential for future disagreements. 
  The paradox for Moscow has been that the more Russia seeks regional hegemony 
through military or other means, the more difficult it becomes for Russia to be seen as a 
responsible pillar of the international system.  For this reason, Russian policy in the 
region has been at times an uncomfortable mixture of bluster and accommodation of 
outside interests, as the CIS has often served as a sidebar to Russia’s relations with the 
United States, Europe, and China.
209
  While Russia holds sway over the governments of 
Central Asia, it is now more comfortable trusting that Ankara and Tehran will not use 
their influence in ways harmful to Moscow.  
In the Caucuses political alignments are more definite.  Turkey’s security partners 
are Israel, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the United States.  Despite its secular identity, 
Ankara has been building mosques in Azerbaijan,
210
 overcoming the misalignment of 
Turkey’s Sunni identity to Azerbaijan’s Shi’ite identity.  These alignments are reflected 
by Pipeline Politics in the region.  Conversely, Russia aligns with Iran and Armenia.   
The Russian invasion of Georgia should have stirred conflict along the lines laid 
out above, yet Turkey refrained from hostility toward Moscow.  Some have written that 
Turkish-Russian relations came under extreme tension at this time, but no lasting 
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ramifications are apparent.
211
  Israel, as a partner of the United States, was involved in 
consolidating Georgia’s alignment against Russia, a point Assad was quick to point out: 
“I think that in Russia and in the world, everyone is now aware of Israel's role and its 
military consultants in the Georgia crisis. And if before in Russia there were people who 
thought these [Israeli] forces can be friendly, now I think no one thinks that way."
212
  
Freedman points out, to be clear, that Assad’s pronouncement was an effort to convince 
Putin to allow Iskander missiles to be sold to Syria, which Putin has resisted because they 
of the threat that sale would pose to Israel.”213 
Western incursions have dampened foreign policy disagreements between Russia, 
Iran, and Turkey over former Soviet spaces.  The coordination that this prompted in the 
early 1990s was deepened by United States actions from 2001 to 2003.  Since 2004, 
Russia’s invasion of Georgia was the only significant trial to the improving coordination, 
and repercussions of Moscow’s action have so far been nonexistent. 
Great Power Status 
 Russian elites yearn to be recognized as a great power.
214
  The embarrassment, 
relegation, and poverty that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union has implanted 
in Moscow a drive to regain the prestige and standing it once had.  For Moscow, this will 
be judged by whether or not Russia can gain the West’s recognition as an equal.  In 
official terms, Russia advocates for a multilateral international system where all state’s 
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interests are considered.  Reading between the lines, Russia is concerned that its own 
interests were ignored in the past.  Chapter two gave discussion to more narrow points 
within the topic of Russian endeavors to gain equal footing to the West. 
 Lo writes that in the late-1990s, after nearly a decade of neglecting the Middle 
East, Russia strived to reestablish its credentials as an indispensable actor in the region.
215
  
However Moscow’s tendency at this time was to only focus on, and then overreact to, 
attention-grabbing crises.
216
  By weighing in on hot-button issues, Moscow sought to 
regain some semblance of being a Great Power. This strategy relies upon truthiness; if 
others believe Russia to be a Great Power than it becomes true, even if Russia is in reality 
a hollow power. 
 While Putin has made a concerted effort to strengthen Russia, the habit of 
clinging to headline-grabbing issues continues.  Freedman writes that Putin’s active role 
in the Middle East aimed to demonstrate Russia is still a great power.  Since the United 
States has long been the state with which Russia wishes to maintain parity, issues 
involving the United States are especially likely to draw Moscow’s attention.  As 
expressed earlier, Russia has learned that countering American interests is often self-
defeating.  Instead, the problems that befuddle US policymakers in the Middle East are 
opportunities for prestige if Moscow can help solve them.  Russia still pursues its own 
interests, rather than working as a subordinate partner to NATO,
217
 but Mankoff is right 
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to say that it is actually the Washington that is stuck in a Cold War mindset for dealing 
with Russia.
218
   
 The Middle East Peace Process has long been the issue that has drawn Moscow’s 
attention in the sense of providing an opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its 
indispensability.  In the 2000s, the Iraq War and the Iranian nuclear program are the 
dominant issues that have attracted Russian attention.  The remainder of this section will 
show that in each of these cases Russia has proven itself unable to significantly alter the 
course of events in the region. 
 As the United States was building its case for war with Iraq, Russian intelligence 
was returning no evidence supporting Iraq was maintaining a WMD program.
219
  Both 
Moscow and Washington held cynical beliefs regarding the other’s position on Iraq: 
Washington believed Russia was sidestepping the oil-for-food program for kickbacks and 
was motivated to keep this arrangement going, while Moscow believed the primary goal 
of the United States was to secure Iraq’s oil for itself.220 
 Unable to convince the United States to back down, Russia tried to get Iraq to 
reach an agreement peacefully.  Primakov writes that in 2003 Putin sent Hussein a private 
message calling on him to step down.
221
  The Russians continued to press Hussein to 
capitulate up until when the United States began the war.  At the same time, Russia sat 
poised to veto any resolution the United States might put forward in the UN Security 
Council.  When the United States withdrew the resolution calling for intervention, 
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sidestepping the Russian veto, it delegitimized Russia’s main emblem of power.  
However Freedman notes that Moscow’s outcry over the Iraq War only picked up once 
the war had already begun.
222
 
 Ideologically, Russia represents an authoritarian state primarily interested in 
stability and economic growth whereas the United States is pushing an agenda of 
democracy and military interference in state sovereignty.  The region’s unhappiness with 
the United States Iraq invasion left Russia well positioned to pursue a new course.  
Freedman writes that beginning in 2004 
Putin decided to formulate a new strategy for Russia in the Middle East, where the U.S. 
position was rapidly weakening due to the growing insurgency in Iraq and the revival of 
the Taliban in Afghanistan. Seeking to exploit the weakened U.S. position, Putin, after a 
visit to Turkey, moved first to court the leading anti-American and anti-Israeli states and 
movements in the region - Syria, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. Subsequently, he was also 
to court the leading Sunni powers in the Middle East - Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and 
the United Arab Emirates - while still trying to maintain good bilateral ties with Israel.
223
 
 
As was previously mentioned, 2004 and 2005 marked the major Russian diplomatic push 
to win over Middle Eastern states’ support for its handling of terrorism.  As governments 
grew wary of the United States agenda, Russia represented a potential counterweight. 
 All the same, Russia, whenever possible, sought to create “win-win” situations by 
becoming involved but not taking firm positions on key issues.  For example, Russia has 
declared that it will help Iran gain nuclear power but opposes Iran gaining a nuclear 
weapons capability.  Thus, Russia is benefitting economically as the West tries to halt the 
Iranian nuclear program.  If the West chooses military intervention, Russia is not 
responsible for the repercussions.  If the Iranians gain nuclear weapons, Russia will not 
be held accountable.     
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Similarly, Russia has remained aligned with the Palestinian cause.  Russia 
continues to be a member of the Quartet, along with the United States, the European 
Union, and the United Nations.  Nizameddin notes that the United States and Israel 
intentionally belittle Russian efforts at helping in the Middle East Peace Process, hoping 
to drive their involvement out.
224
  But for the Russian the Palestine issue remains 
paramount, as it was mentioned in both the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept.   
Historically, Russia has had awful relations with Israel, and those relations only 
started improving in the early to mid-1990s.  Moscow deeply resented the flow of Soviet 
Jews to Israel, and blatant anti-Semitism existed in USSR propaganda.
225
  Nizameddin 
also says that Russian sense of morality was genuinely offended by Israeli actions toward 
Palestinians.
226
  Polls suggest that less than 30% of Russians view Israel favorably.
227
  
For years Russia was close to Yasser Arafat, Primakov considers him a personal friend 
(Primakov also calls Israel ‘plain stubborn’), and in later years Russia has hosted 
Palestinian groups like Fatah, the PLO, and Hamas in Moscow on official visits despite 
their statuses on the United States terror list.  Finally, Israel’s neighbors would not be 
credible security threats in the absence of the Russian weapons that they buy. 
Still, Russia views creating peace in the Middle East as a critical endeavor.  
Bowker mentions Russian concern that the United States approach will breed future 
generations of Islamic radicalism that could blow back into Russia’s south.228  Elevated 
above the reasons for Russian interest already laid out is that Russia wants its role in the 
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Middle East Peace Process to affirm its status as a country that matters.  Lo writes, “Few 
believed Russia could play more than a secondary role.  What counted, however, was the 
idea of influence; image, if not everything, was certainly the most important thing.”229 
Russia has not succeeded in bettering any of the longstanding problems facing the 
region.  Lately, it seems as though tiny Qatar has made more progress as an arbitrator in 
the region’s disputes.  Nor has Russia yet shown an ability to achieve a desired policy 
outcome in the face of strong US opposition. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY EFECTIVENESS IN THE  
MIDDLE EAST 
 Russian foreign policy in the Middle East has been mainly conducted by the top 
figures of government, who work to create agreements, and the Russian business interests 
who are closely associated with the government and work to carry out the agreements.  
This chapter will consider whether or not these agents have been successful in working 
toward their policy goals since 2000. 
Terrorism 
 Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) shows that incidents of 
terrorism have risen dramatically in Russia since 2007, from approximately 60 incidents 
that year to over 250 in 2010.  During the second Chechen War, which is when 
transnational Islamist networks began playing a major role, there were never greater than 
150 terrorist incidents per year.  The scholarship presented in chapter two suggests that 
beginning in 2003 Russia began seeing breakthroughs in its effort to cut down on terrorist 
support from the Middle East, with the tours around the region in 2004 taken by Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin.  However the data does not reflect 
this. 
 The GTD relies on publicly available information.  So, the GTD lists the number 
of terrorist attacks in the Soviet Union in 1985, 1986, and 1987 as zero.  If there were 
incidents of terrorism, they would not have been available via open source.  Given 
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Russia’s low scores for press freedom230 it would not be surprising if the rise in incidents 
of terrorism had to do with a declining ability of Russia to censor news of small incidents 
of terrorism.  Next, the coding during the Chechen Wars would have been difficult 
because terrorism is defined by GTD as taking place against noncombatants, which 
disregards a number of incidents in Chechnya.  Most significantly, GTD changed its data 
collectors in April of 2008, from the Center for Terrorism and Intelligence Studies in 
partnership with START to the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups at the University 
of New Haven.  That switch coincides with the year that incidents of terrorism in Russia 
exploded.  It was also at this time insurgents shifted from Chechnya to Dagestan and 
Ingushetia.
231
  
 If problems of recording incidents of terrorism are responsible for the dramatic 
increase recently, it would seem that those problems would be overcome when 
considering incidents of terrorism involving 10 or more deaths.  Using that threshold, any 
incident of terrorism should have been picked up by the GTD.  From 2005 forward, there 
has been only one terrorist attack that killed more than thirty people.
232
  In fact, through 
2008 there were only a handful of attacks that killed more than ten people.  Large attacks 
increased in 2009 to three, and again in 2010 to five. 
 A problematic assumption in this analysis is that incidents of terrorism directly 
reflect foreign support.  Unfortunately quantitative information on foreign support for 
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Chechnya is not publicly available.  The main financer of terrorist groups in the Caucuses 
is the Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade.  Not only has Russia succeeded at 
killing its leadership, but as the Council on Foreign Relations notes, since 2001 US-led 
efforts have curtailed terrorist finance networks.  Sure enough, there was a large drop 
from 2001 to 2004 in the number of terrorist incidents in the GTD data.  However, this 
time period also coincided with fallout from the Second Chechen War winding down. 
 Further, if it is a global terrorist network that is responsible for fueling the 
insurgency in Chechnya, it would also seem possible that that network shifted its focus to 
fighting the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq.  As Katz noted, Russia is concerned 
that as the Iraq war winds down Islamists will shift their focus back to Chechnya.  This 
possibility cannot be assessed with the available data.   
Russia’s strategy in the Middle East assumes that foreign governments have the 
ability to curtail support for Chechen separatists.  Russia believes that support is coming 
mostly from Sunnis, and that the Saudi Arabian government is able to be check that 
support.  Russia also believes that the Muslim Brotherhood is a crucial sponsor of the 
insurgency; one of Putin’s stops during his post-Beslan tour was to Egypt, where he 
discussed confronting Islamic terrorism with President Hosni Mubarak.  Further, Putin 
appointed Ramzon Kadyrov, a Muslim Chechen loyal to Moscow, as Chechnya’s 
president and envoy to Muslim heads of state.   
Putin has stated that he believes socioeconomic conditions in Chechnya allow for 
its population to become radicalized.  By his logic, if adequate economic improvements 
are made, then foreign elements will be less able to convince Muslim Russians to take up 
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arms against Moscow.  That approach does not rely on successful foreign relations, 
instead endorsing Russia’s ability to diminish Islamic terrorism internally.   
While cutting down on terrorist activity is the ultimate goal, diminishing criticism 
from Muslim leaders is also critical.  In 2005, Putin sided against the Dutch cartoonists 
who drew defamatory images of the Prophet Muhammad, and shortly thereafter Russia 
was given observer status on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.  The Ninth Islamic 
Summit in 2000 stated in its Communique 
The Conference called on the Government of the Russian Federation to continue 
negotiations with the representatives of the Chechen people as soon as possible with a 
view to reaching a peaceful settlement of the situation in Chechnya, taking into 
consideration the appropriate international instruments on human rights. It also urged the 
Government of the Russian Federation and the international community to take action 
towards ensuring the protection of the Chechen refugees in the camps north of the 
Caucasus and to take part in the reconstruction and development of Chechnya. The 
Conference expressed its readiness to pursue contacts with the Government of the 
Russian Federation to facilitate the peaceful settlement of the crisis in Chechnya.
233
 
 
However, the Tenth Islamic Summit in 2003, the Third Extraordinary Summit in 2005, 
and the Eleventh Islamic Summit in 2008 did not mention the Chechnya issue in their 
final Communiques.  In fact, the 2005 Communique stated 
The Conference renewed its support for and endorsement of the Secretary General’s 
efforts, initiatives, and good offices in the search of just solutions to the causes of Muslim 
communities and minorities in non-OIC Member States…all within the framework of 
respect for the sovereignty of the States to which these Muslims belong.
234
 
 
At least in the OIC, Russia has succeeded in removing the issue of its Muslim separatists 
as a noteworthy issue. 
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 Finally, it appears that Middle Eastern leaders have stopped publicly addressing 
issues in southern Russia with religious terminology or context.  A 2011 article appearing 
in Al Jazeera about the legal status of Chechens living in Turkey suggests that one of the 
two states most critical to supporting Chechens has changed its approach.  It says, “While 
Turkey takes [Chechen refugees] in, and allows them to live in the country, the Chechens 
cannot legally work here or send their children to school.  They are not legally defined as 
refugees.”235  The article points out that Turkey must straddle its desire to be a leader in 
the Muslim world with its commitments to Russia.  For now it appears that Turkey has 
chosen to show its leadership by confronting other problems facing the Muslim world, 
leaving the Chechnya issue alone.  As for King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah 
II of Jordan, or Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran, none of these leaders have provided critical 
statements on the treatment Russian Muslims over the last several years. 
Arms Transfers 
 Russia has succeeded in increasing its arms transfers to the Middle East, from 
approximately $1.226 billion (in current dollars) in 2000 to $2,830 billion in 2011, with a 
high of $3.565 billion in 2010.
236
  In 2000 Russia only transferred arms to five different 
states: Algeria, Iran, Yemen, UAE, and Syria. In 2010 Russia transferred arms to thirteen 
different states: the five from 2000 as well as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Palestine, 
Libya, Sudan, and Turkey.  Also, Russia sent arms to Morocco from 2005-2008.  
Increasingly, states are turning to Russia to purchase their arms. 
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 While Russia has taken criticism for supplying arms to autocracies from the 
United States and others, that criticism is hypocritical.  The United States supplies arms 
to states listed as “Not Free” in Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World 2012” report as 
well, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Oman, UAE, and Yemen.
237
  
Russia has been careful not to supply states weapons that upset the strategic balance in 
the region, especially in regard to Syria and Iran.   
 This differs dramatically from the Cold War period in which Russia was arming 
states with the aim of having them match the capabilities of the states that the United 
States was arming.  Israel seems willing to allow Russia to walk a tightrope of arming 
Israel’s enemies while pursuing good relations with Israel on other tracks.  A possible 
explanation for this difference is that the United States has managed to establish itself as 
the military hegemon in the region, already having demonstrated an ability to easily 
defeat one of the region’s strongest armies.  Rather than arm themselves, states are reliant 
on the United States for security provision.   
 Thus it is difficult to assess whether or not selling weapons musters influence in 
the way that it used to.  The consensus belief is that Russia does not have that purpose in 
mind when it makes arms transfers; instead it wants only to make money.  High volumes 
of arms transfers do seem to underscore friendly relations more generally, as is the case 
with Algeria, Iran, and Syria.  Despite being competing suppliers of natural gas to 
Europe, Russia and Algeria have repeatedly held discussions in which they discuss 
coordinating their gas policies.  Both are aware that if the other follows its self-interest 
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too aggressively, they could be hurt.  Moscow’s only significant political gain derived 
from its arms transfers has been successful use of the threat of selling advanced weapons 
to Syria to earn concessions from Israel.   
 Still Russia has succeeded in raising its arms transfers into the Middle East.  If it 
can develop higher technology equipment, which would also be higher priced equipment, 
it might begin selling to the rest of the oil-rich Gulf States.  Also, Russia is able to use its 
position on the Security Council to veto any sanctions on arms transfers to its client 
states.  The only shortcoming of Moscow’s strategy is that it has, over the past few 
decades, been willing to provide loans to states that are earmarked for purchasing Russian 
weapons.  Repeatedly, Russia has had to forgive these loans.  It has happened with 
Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen among others.  Russia would prefer its customers be 
states that are flush with cash, rather than continue risking countries defaulting on their 
loans.  Planned domestic efforts to improve the Russian arms industry may alter the 
customers of Russian arms transfers, but there is no indication that Moscow will exploit 
its position as a major arms supplier for political gains any better than it has in the past 
decade. 
Energy Resources 
 The energy sector is another area in which the Russian goal is essentially to 
maximize profits.  Russia’s success is largely attributable to rising energy prices, but still 
Moscow deserves some credit for their management of energy politics.  In 2000, the price 
of a barrel of oil was $27.60.
238
  In 2010 the price of a barrel was $77.45, a 181% 
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increase.
239
  Prices peaked in 2008 at $94.45.
240
  From 2000 to 2010, the value of Russia 
Urals crude oil increased from $26.58 to $78.39, peaking in 2008 at $94.87.
241
  At the 
same time, Russia increased its oil exports from 3.06 million barrels per day in 2000 to 
7.85 million barrels per day in 2010.
242
  Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia only increased its 
exports from 6.25 million barrels per day to 7.59 million barrels per day.
243
  By not 
cooperating with OPEC, which often seeks to keep the price of oil steady, Russia was 
able to more than double its production while benefitting from quickly rising prices.  
Fortunately for Russia, this behavior does not appear to have worsened Russia’s relations 
with the Middle East oil-producing states, perhaps largely because relations were not that 
strong to begin with. 
 Russian natural gas exports have risen from 131.5 billion cubic meters in 2000 to 
223.4 billion cubic meters in 2010.  Prices have risen from around $110 per thousand 
cubic meters in 2000 to about $440 per thousand cubic meters in 2012.
244
  The peak 
prices came in late 2008, reaching $575 per thousand cubic meters.
245
  Some of the 
increased profit came from adding Turkey as a customer.  More significant for assessing 
Russia’s foreign relations with the Middle East is the complete lack of progress on the 
Nabucco pipeline.  Going forward, Russia should be judged by its ability to better 
coordinate its natural gas strategies with Qatar, Algeria, and Libya, all of which are 
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competing suppliers of gas to Europe.  Qatar, for example, increased its natural gas 
exports threefold from 2006 to 2010.
246
 
 Russia, Iran, and Turkey have not been able to construct pipelines to export 
resources out of the Caspian region.  Disputes among Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan over how resources should be distributed remain largely 
unresolved.  Iran favors an equal division of resources among the five states, Russia 
prefers resources be allocated in proportion with coastline.  Since 2005, the United States 
and China have become increasingly interested in the outcome of these disputes, as they 
hold significant geostrategic implications for influence in Central Asia.  The continued 
stalemate cannot be deemed as good for Moscow, as it would benefit from unlocking 
Caspian energy resources.  However, the muddled state of affairs that prevents the United 
States or China from achieving their desired outcomes keeps the stalemate from being 
deemed a failure for Russia as well. 
General Trade 
 As was stated in chapter three, Russian exports worldwide exploded in 2003, and 
exports to the Middle East were no different.  In 2001 Russian exports to the region were 
approximately $6 billion, and in the peak year of 2008 exports were around $42 billion, a 
seven fold increase.
247
  In 2010 exports to the region were still at $26.5 billion, and 
through the first two quarters of 2011 exports were increasing, although only slightly, 
which is good given the Arab Spring (through the first two quarters of 2011, exports to 
Egypt were down 66% compared to 2010). 
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 Accounting for the increased trade between Russia and the Middle East over the 
past decade is difficult because there have not been major political events heralding in 
new trade agreements or new organizational memberships.  Russia adding Turkey as a 
natural gas customer was significant.  The price of oil increased in the early part of the 
decade, and while that increases the overall wealth of the region in some ways, the actual 
oil producing states were not the source of increased trade, except for Iran.  Instead, states 
like Turkey, Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Algeria were the difference makers.  High estimates 
of how much the Iraq invasion would cost Russia in the form of lost trade (listed as 
multiple billions) relied on incredibly ambitious pre-war projections.  Trade spiked in 
2002, which might have indicated the start of the same meteoric rise seen elsewhere in 
the region.  However, compared to pre-2002 exports, post-2003 exports are no more than 
$100 million less annually than what would have been expected in a 2001 forecast. 
 Assigning directional causality between improved trade and improved political 
relations between Russia and Middle Eastern states is also difficult.  Kruetz notes that 
only 20% of Russian business is small business, compared to 70% in the United States.
248
  
This highlights that Russia’s economy is heavily controlled by a few elite oligarchs who 
truly run the country.  Increasing mutually beneficial trade relations does not suggest 
gained influence on the part of Russia in the Middle East, but as more Russian elites 
interact with elites in the Middle East, the prospects for coordination on other issues 
improve as well. 
 Still Russia has to be frustrated by its inability to grow trade relations with the 
Arab Gulf States beyond what they are now.  Russia’s cheaper consumer goods struggle 
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to break into markets where competition favors high end products from Europe and the 
United States.  As fellow rentier states, the Arab Gulf economies are similar in their 
industrial diversification to Russia’s economy, so Russia’s competitive advantages match 
the Gulf States’, and therefore less market space exists for Russian goods and services. 
Influence over Former Soviet Spaces 
 Chapter three presented a view of Russia’s interaction with the Middle East 
regarding influence over former Soviet spaces as one in which traditional rivals for 
influence, Turkey and Iran in particular, were steadily increasing their coordination with 
Moscow.  This trend was attributed to the entry of the West and China as actors in these 
spaces, and a desire on the part of the traditional powers to keep them out.  Ultimately 
Moscow’s major concern is that instability and other transnational issues could spill 
across international borders into Russia’s south. 
Trying to quantitatively measure how well Russia has coalesced Tehran and 
Ankara is a fool’s errand.  Bill Emmott, writing for IISS, listed factors that are important 
for strategic influence, but concluded that they were ultimately not quantifiable.  “Chief 
among those unmeasurables are the deployability of whatever assets a country may have, 
the attitude the policy-making elite of that country has to the deployment of its assets, and 
the perceptions held of that country’s willingness or eagerness to use its assets to achieve 
its goals.”249  This limitation means that assessing how well Russia has achieved its goal 
of shaping the Middle East’s role in former Soviet spaces relies primarily on subjective 
evidence. 
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The most significant success for Russia in this area, working with Iran to find a 
peaceful resolution to conflict in Tajikistan, preceded Putin’s presidency.  The other 
surprising occurrence, Ankara’s lack of an outcry over Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008, 
is another indication that Moscow has somehow succeeded in reducing the competitive 
nature within the Iran-Turkey-Russia geostrategic triangle.  Ankara and Moscow support 
opposite sides in the Naborno-Karabakh dispute, but neither has done so in significant 
overt ways during Putin’s presidency.  The three governments have discussed combatting 
drug smuggling in coordination with each other, although formally this has not yet 
occurred. 
There are hazards to advancing a counterfactual argument, but the general lack of 
conflict and instability in former Soviet spaces matters.  All three of these governments 
are capable of undercutting the others’ interests in as they relate to states of the CIS.  The 
absence of such actions is significant.  Further, each state is in agreement that entries of 
Western influence are detrimental.  Following the Russia-Georgia War, Turkey sought to 
create a new pact of security and cooperation in the Caucasus.  That a central component 
of this effort was declaring foreign powers should stay out of the region, and that Ankara 
solicited Moscow’s input on creating the pact, both bode well for Russia. 
Great Power Status 
 Russia’s foreign policy goal in the Middle East of enhancing its status as a Great 
Power is, like the prior goal, difficult to quantify.  Other studies seeking to measure state 
status and strategic influence have considered variables like approval ratings and UN 
voting patterns.  However, as Emmott points out, measurement is “often not sufficient 
 86 
 
and can even be misleading; it leads you to focus only on those things that are 
measurable, and to overlook the many, perhaps equally important, things that are not.”250  
Once again an abstract goal of Russian foreign policy will be assessed subjectively. 
 Among the major issues that Russia decided to actively weigh in on, it was not 
unable to achieve its desired outcomes in any instance.  In 2003 the United States 
launched its Iraq war despite Russian objections.  Russia has been unable to build a 
coalition supporting Iran’s right to nuclear power; instead the United States is building 
consensus around punishing Iran for its suspected interest in nuclear weapons.  At least in 
this case Russia was able to veto Security Council resolutions placing sanctions on Iran.  
Russia sided with Syria in the mid-2000s in their disputes over withdrawal from 
Lebanon, which did not win Moscow any new friends in the region.  Finally, advancing 
the Middle East Peace Process is an incredibly difficult task to pursue, but Moscow’s 
failure at its immediate goal of hosting peace talks can be labeled a failure. 
 Finally, Russia appears to have failed to capitalize on the space for influence in 
the Middle East opened up to it by the United States invasion of Iraq.  Bowker writes that 
so long as it does not interfere with the national interest, Russia still seeks out a positive 
relationship with the United States.
251
  Lo and Mankoff both describe Russia and the 
West having ideological differences centered on democracy versus authoritarianism.
252
  
However neither sees the ideological differences keeping Russia from cooperating with 
the West on the provision of security.   Mankoff explains that Moscow has a tendency to 
listen when appeals are made for Russia to participate as a responsible great power; the 
                                                 
250
 Bill Emmott, “Measuring Strategic Influence,” 2. 
251
 Bowker, Russia, America and the Islamic World, 165. 
252
 Lo, Russian foreign policy in the post-soviet era, 166, and Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 301. 
 87 
 
flattery too much to resist.
253
  Overall, Moscow has not demonstrated an ability to 
achieve policy outcomes regarding the intractable disputes in the region, nor does 
Moscow appear to have had a coherent plan for establishing itself as a credible 
counterweight to the United States in the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RUSSIAN POLICY THROUGH THE ARAB SPRING 
 Russian foreign policy during the Arab Spring has been consistent with its policy 
since 2000.  While Russia’s approach to Libya and Syria was more measured than the 
United States’, attributing that difference to Russian indifference toward democracy and 
human rights is short sighted.  An examination of how Russia’s interests have held up 
throughout the Arab Spring will reveal that Russia has weathered the storm well despite 
its general reactionary approach. 
Terrorism 
 Hosni Mubarak never challenged Russia’s discretion in dealing with Chechnya, 
viewing it as an internal problem all along.  Even before the 2004 Beslan terrorist attack, 
Mubarak during state visits would affirm a mutual interest in fighting terrorism at joint 
press conferences with Putin.  Further, Mubarak held in check the Muslim Brotherhood, a 
group that Russia has labeled a terrorist organization because of its alleged ties to 
Chechen fighters.  Mubarak’s ouster removes a constraint on what Russia fears could 
again become a global Islamic extremist movement. 
 In Yemen too Moscow is concerned that space has been created for terrorist 
groups to prosper, particularly Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP).  While the states 
altered by the Arab Spring have had unsavory dictators, because those leaders did not 
base their mantle on religion, none allowed space for radical Islamic groups to prosper.  
Russia may be more fearful then is warranted—evidence for a new wave of turmoil in the 
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south does not match speculation—but Russia remains vigilant.  The last major terror 
attack in Russia was carried out by a suicide bomber at a Moscow airport on January 24, 
2011, the day before protests broke out in Egypt. 
 These concerns extend to Syria as well.  Lavrov said in his major speech on the 
Arab Spring, “one should not ignore the fact that for a long time now [Syrian authorities 
have] been fighting not unarmed men, but combat units, such as the so-called Free Syrian 
Army and extremist groups including al-Qaeda which have lately committed a series of 
murderous terrorist acts.”254  Moscow is concerned that the situation in Syria as one in 
which Saudi Arabia is funding Sunni groups against Iranian-backed factions (the Assad 
government included).  Moscow detects a pattern occurring in Syria that has happened 
elsewhere.  Saudi Arabia uses its Islamic credentials to empower Islamist groups beyond 
its borders.  For Russia, a Sunni Islamist Syria creates a new bridge for Sunni extremism 
to reach Russia and the CIS. 
Arms Transfers 
 As mentioned earlier, it is actually the United States that saw a large bump in its 
arms sales to the region from 2010 to 2011, which is partially attributable to the Arab 
Spring.  Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf States saw the largest increases in 
arms transfers from the United States.  Meanwhile, the only states that increased their 
arms transfers from Russia were Iraq and Sudan, neither by significant amounts.  The 
idea that autocrats on unsteady thrones can turn to Russia for weapons to suppress their 
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populations is not borne out by the data.  Overall, Russian arms transfers to the Middle 
East decreased by 20.6%. 
 Top Russian arms purchasers have had a mixed record during the Arab Spring.  
Going through the top Russian arms customers in order, Algeria was incredibly efficient 
in undercutting protests in their infancy.  Iran has not had sustained protests either.  But 
President Saleh in Yemen is now out of power, as is Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and Assad 
in Syria is struggling to keep his hold on power.  The other two large importers, Sudan 
and UAE, have not been subject to large Arab Spring protests.  Despite news reports of 
Russian arms floating around Libya, that country was actually the twelfth largest 
importer of Russian arms from 2000 to 2011. 
 Russia has refused to cancel contracts for future arms transfers with Syria.  These 
contracts are for expensive, advanced equipment like fighter planes.  Syria and states like 
it already have all of the arms they need to suppress their own people.  The arms that 
Russia is transferring now are significant in that they could aid these countries in 
defending against foreign intervention.  As before, Russia will continue to not sell states 
weapons that could significantly alter the basic balance of power in the region, be it 
between Syria and Israel or Iran and its rivals.  Stability is valued over profit.   
Energy Resources 
 Among the states that have been majorly affected by the Arab Spring (Tunisia, 
Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria), only Libya concerns Russian interests 
regarding natural resources.  While Bahrain has oil wealth, the outcome of upheaval there 
was never a threat to shock world oil markets much beyond OPECs ability to adjust 
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production.  Should Bahrain undergo further turmoil that upsets world oil prices, Russia 
will do little more than sow increased profits. 
 Libya is a natural gas supplier to Europe, so it is important to Russia in that it can 
undermine Russia’s near monopoly to some degree.  It is also a large enough oil producer 
to effect global prices, although if it Libya drives prices up, Russia benefits.  Russia 
should be concerned that in the long term Libya’s production under new government 
could mean a new competitor for its European customers.  Qatar’s eagerness to begin 
partnerships with the new Libyan government, which was underway even before Gadhafi 
was overthrown, should make Moscow even more wary.  
General Trade 
 Russian exports worldwide continued to grow at an impressive rate through the 
first two quarters of 2011, while trade to the Middle East showed some growth as well.  
First quarter exports to the Middle East in 2011 were 7.2% higher than in 2010, although 
second quarter exports in 2011 were 1.06% lower than in 2010.
255
  This difference is 
largely explained by variance in exports to Turkey. 
 Specific states that imported significantly less from Russia are Israel, Egypt, and 
Algeria.  Egypt specifically imported about $350 million less per quarter in the first half 
of 2011 compared to 2010.  Meanwhile, states like Iran, Tunisia, UAE, Morocco, and 
Syria have all increased their Russian imports by amounts approaching $100 million per 
quarter.  While there was never a large volume of trade with Yemen, Russia’s exports to 
that country have fallen nearly to zero.  Likewise Libya, which had not been a major 
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trading partner with Russia, imported from Russia about 15% of what it had the year 
before.
256
 
 The trade data reveals the importance of stability for Russia.  While the region did 
not decrease its purchases of Russian products overall, the political quakes seem to have 
prevented a continuation of the high growth of Russian exports to the Middle East.  Still, 
Tunisia and Syria increased their imports from Russia through the first half of 2011 
despite domestic upheaval.  If several states in the region can come out of the Arab 
Spring with political arrangements that allow for more dynamic economic growth, than 
Russia will be able to export more in the long term. 
Influence over Former Soviet Spaces 
 In a recent article, Stephen Blank and Carol R. Saivetz write,  
The fact that Islamist forces are poised to gain significantly across the region raises fears 
in Moscow that such revolutions could be repeated in the restive North Caucasus and 
Central Asia.  At the very least, newly empowered Islamist forces could potentially 
provide aid to the Islamist forces fighting governments—both in the Caucasus and in 
Central Asia.
257
 
 
This fear is not Russia’s alone, but is shared by the governments of states like Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.  All of these 
governments are trying to pick out lessons from the Arab Spring to better ensure their 
own grasp on power. 
 Given Russia’s power and relative stability, this has provided an opportunity for 
CIS states to be drawn further back into the Russian orbit.  Member states of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization have discussed creating a rapid deployment force 
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that could be used to counter challenges to the heads of state.
258
  The group is also 
discussing pooling their resources to create better controls on cyberspace.  However 
Blank and Saivetz note, “If Russia is unable to prevent Assad’s removal from office, it is 
highly unlikely that either Central Asian or Middle Eastern leaders will listen to Russian 
advice for reform.”259 
 Turkey and Iran, the two states of the Middle East that contend with Russia for 
influence in the CIS, have been affected by the Arab Spring in opposing ways.  The 
Iranian government appears to be on lockdown, evidenced by escalating tensions with the 
United States and others over both its nuclear program and its supposed continued 
support for terrorism.  Meanwhile Turkey has emerged as a potential regional leader, 
often cited as the example of Islamic democracy that states like Tunisia and Egypt should 
seek to follow.  Turkey has not yet “turned East” completely; relations with Europe are 
still more important in any measurable sense.  So long as Turkey’s dynamism continues, 
it will be an appealing voice to the CIS, if not to its leadership than to the broader 
populations.  Russia must note these shifts to better its strategies for providing stability to 
Central Asia. 
Great Power Status 
 Libya and Syria both became proving grounds for the importance of Russia as a 
principal provider of global security.  In the case of Libya, Russia ultimately abstained 
when provided the opportunity to veto a Security Council resolution that implemented a 
no-fly zone over Libya, perhaps because an impending humanitarian disaster seemed 
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probable.  When NATO began helping the Rebels push onward to Tripoli, Russia was 
dismayed but also powerless and ignored. 
 The fall back approach to dealing with conflict, harking back to their strategy 
throughout the Cold War, is for Russia to use their connections to both sides of the 
conflict to mediate.  Blank and Saivetz explain, “A Russian-mediated end to the war [in 
Libya] would have enshrined Moscow’s return to the Middle East as a major player and 
proven to the West that the Kremlin was indispensable in settling regional conflicts.”260  
However was not meant to be.  All that was left for Russia to do was to again defend 
economic interests—money owed from previous arms sales and deals made for Russian 
development of Libyan energy resources. 
 Russia would not allow the West to gain the upper hand in Syria in the same way.  
Not only did Russia have the lesson of Libya, but Syria is a much more important ally.  
Many have suggested that Libya was a close partner to Moscow, but that appears to be a 
conclusion reached by simply noting Libya was an ally of Washington.  Syria has been a 
major consumer of Russian arms and an importer of Russian products.  It is also a key 
state in regional power balancing, which Moscow values as a source of stability in the 
realist perspective. 
 Russia has defended the Assad government in the United Nations Security 
Council.  It has not allowed significant sanctions and will not allow outside interference 
in the internal affairs of the state.  At the same time, Russia is seeking to mediate between 
the various parties to the conflict, again hoping to prove its invaluable role to security in 
the region.  In this case, Russia has a better chance for success, mainly because of the 
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lack of other possible arbiters.  Further, the West appears weary of intervention in Syria, 
for a multiplicity of reasons.  It is difficult to assess if Russia could defend its client so 
easily if faced with a gung-ho West. 
 Despite regional upheaval, Russia still has its eyes on the Middle East Peace 
Process prize.  During a March 12, 2012 speech on the Arab Spring, Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov said,  
The “Arab Spring” should in no way be used as a pretext to weaken attention to the 
Palestinian issue. We are convinced that the conflict potential in the Middle East and 
Northern Africa will remain high until a comprehensive settlement is achieved in the 
Middle East within the existing international legal framework. This is a truly historical 
duty of the international community and the UN Security Council.
261
 
Much of the Russian approach to the Arab Spring has been reactionary.  This may be 
attributed to a desire to not interfere in other states’ sovereignty, but more common is the 
assessment that Moscow was “caught with their pants down.”  The Israel-Palestine issue 
represents one area in which Moscow has been proactive, although Russia has still not 
won hosting duties for Israel and Palestine, which is a top priority, Moscow has remained 
focused on this historical source of conflict in the region.  Solving it would bring much 
highly desired prestige. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 Since Vladimir Putin’s ascension to the presidency, Russia has accomplished its 
goals of reducing Middle Eastern support for terrorism, diversifying and increasing arms 
transfers to the region, ensuring that Middle Eastern states do not hamper the profitability 
of Russia’s energy exports, and expanding and deepening trade between Russia and the 
Middle East.  While it is not clear that Russia has effectively shaped relations between 
the Middle East and former Soviet spaces to its own benefit, the lack of evidence 
suggesting that Turkey and Iran are using their influence in opposition to Russia’s 
interests indicates that Moscow is at least not failing in this regard.  However, Moscow’s 
goal of acting in the Middle East such that Russia demonstrates its status as a Great 
Power has not yielded any noteworthy results. 
In the Soviet era, the factors that motivated abandoning ideological pursuits in the 
Middle East in favor of pragmatic ones were ideological incongruities, unreliable, 
calculating partners, and a manipulative United States.  Why Russia has been successful 
in achieving several of its goals in the region over the past decade relates to those same 
factors.  In areas of trade, arms transfers, and energy resource exploitation, ideological 
differences between Russia and the Middle East are unimportant.  The apolitical nature of 
these goals makes calculating partners and manipulation by the United States non-issues. 
 For reducing terrorism, the key for Moscow was eliminating ideological incongruities by
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convincing leaders of Russia's right to solve its internal problems as it sees fit.  In 
coordinating on former Soviet spaces, Russia was greatly aided by US incursions, a 
source of influence that Middle East actors saw as possibly upsetting the status quo.  
Traditional issues of unreliable partners and a calculating United States only dislodge 
Moscow’s goal of reestablishing itself as a Great Power. 
 Russia has not attempted issue linkage as part of its conduct in the Middle East. 
 For example, Moscow and Turkey disagree on several issues, namely support for 
Chechens, Bosporus Strait shipping, and the Kurdish issue.  Yet the two are cooperating 
on general trade, on energy resources, and on keeping foreign powers out of former 
Soviet spaces.  Russia could, as it did with Ukraine, tie the flow of natural gas to policy 
changes it wants Turkey to make.  It appears that if relations between Russia and a 
Middle Eastern government based on one of the four pragmatic factors work well, the 
positive experience encourages the possibility for bilateral relations to expand. 
 Russia's pragmatic achievements have not led to increasing political influence, 
which for Russia would lessen the challenge of achieving abstract goals.  For example, 
Russia never attempted to translate its good trade relations, significant arms transfers, 
energy resource coordination, and cooperation on fighting Sunni Islamist terrorism with 
Iran into winning concessions from Iranian on the nuclear weapons issue.  It is possible 
that in the future all of the connections Russia is now laying in the region will pay off in 
the form of political sway, but that has not yet happened.  Until that occurs, Russia’s 
successes on pragmatic matters will not create perceptions of Russia as a Great Power. 
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 For United States policymakers, recognizing Russian interests in the Middle East, 
as well as which goals they are capable of achieving and which goals they are not, is 
important for pursuing US priorities in the region.  Russia can be trusted to not transfer 
arms into the region so advanced that they will upset the persisting strategic balance. 
 Moscow can be co-opted on matters of security provision.  Conversely, ignoring Russian 
input on hot-button issues will invite bluster and objections, even if the US is not acting 
against Russian interests.  Moscow originally began souring on the US war in 
Afghanistan only when the Bush Administration appeared disinterested in Russian advice 
on best practices for fighting a war in Afghanistan. 
 The major challenges that Russia will face going forward is ensuring its strong 
partnerships with states like Iran and Syria are not disrupted, improving inroads to the 
Gulf, where Moscow has so far not been particularly successful in achieving its 
pragmatic goals, coordinating with an independent-minded Qatar, particularly on the 
issue of natural gas, and coordinating more closely with Turkey on broader political 
matters.  Moscow views Western advocacy for liberal democracy as a front to expand its 
influence.  When that advocacy leads to calls for military intervention, Russia sees the 
United States as stealing its allies via illegitimate application of force.  Now that Russia 
has become more robust and assertive, it will not allow the West to trounce its interests 
as occurred in Serbia and Iraq.  However Russia's attachment is to the benefits reaped by 
having allies, not to the allies themselves.   Russia will not strongly detest changes to 
compliant governments so long as they occur in a way that left Russian interests within 
the target states intact, as was the case recently in Egypt. 
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 Future research on this topic should seek to deepen understanding of the local 
agents for policy influence between Russia and the Middle East.  Russian relations have 
been dominated by business-like relationships, only these business relationships happen 
to be state-owned.  Comparing this to other extra-regional state’s mechanisms would be 
useful.  Several elements of soft power, such as educational exchanges, went 
unconsidered in this paper.  Next, this thesis sought to evaluate Russia's influence on the 
Middle East, but it did not fully develop how the Middle East influences Russia.  Last, 
development and application of a more disciplined approach to gauging influence would 
be helpful not just in assessing Russia-Middle East relations, but more generally in the 
field of international studies.  
 In comparison with its overarching policy goals vis-à-vis the West and former 
Soviet spaces, Moscow is fairly placid in its conduct in the Middle East.  Currently 
Russia is obfuscating United States goals in the region; however memories of the Soviet 
Union are clouding understanding of Russian behavior.  Moscow is pursuing a pragmatic 
policy line that prioritizes stability.  While human rights violations horrify observers in 
the West, for Moscow the most terrifying prospect is contemplating how much more the 
region could unravel if stability is not prioritized. 
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Appendix A1: Russian Arms Transfers to the Middle East 
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Appendix A2: United States Arms Transfers to the Middle East 
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